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Zurek’s derivation of the Born rule from envariance (environment-assisted invariance) is tightened
up, somewhat generalized, and extended to encompass all possibilities. By this, besides Zurek’s most
important work also the works of 5 other commentators of the derivation is taken into account, and
selected excerpts commented upon. All this is done after a detailed theory of twin unitaries,which
are the other face of envariance.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta, 03.65.Ca
I. INTRODUCTION
Zurek has introduced [1] envariance (environment-
assisted invariance) in the following way. He imag-
ined a system S entangled with a dynamically decou-
pled environment E altogether described by a bipar-
tite state vector | ψ 〉SE . Further, he imagined two
opposite-subsystem unitary operators uS and uE
that ”counter-transformed” each other when elevated
to the composite system US ≡ (uS ⊗ 1E), UE ≡
(1S ⊗ uE), and applied to the bipartite state vector, e.
g.,
UEUS |ψ〉SE =|ψ〉SE . (1)
Zurek remarked: ”When the transformed property of
the system can be so ”untransformed” by acting only
on the environment, it is not the property of S.”
Zurek, further, paraphrases Bohr’s famous dictum: ”If
the reader does not find envariance strange, he has not
understood it.”
The first aim of this study is to acquire a full under-
standing of envariance. The wish to understand envari-
ance as much as possible is not motivated only by its
strangeness, but also by the fact that Zurek makes use of
it to derive one of the basic laws of quantum mechanics:
Born’s rule. His argument to this purpose gave rise to
critical comments and inspired analogous attempts [2],
[3], [4], [5].
Since the term ”Born’s rule” is not widely used, the
term ”probability rule of quantum mechanics” will be
utilized instead in this article.
The probability rule in its general form states that if
E is an event or property (mathematically a projector
in the state space) of the system, and ρ is its state
(mathematically a density operator), then the probability
of the former in the latter is tr(Eρ). (This form of the
probability rule is called the ”trace rule”). It is easy to
see that an equivalent, and perhaps more practical, form
of the probability rule is the following: If | φ〉 is an
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arbitrary state vector of the system, then 〈φ | ρ | φ〉
is the probability that in a suitable measurement on the
system in the state ρ the event |φ〉〈φ| will occur. This
is what is meant by the probability rule in this article.
(For a proof of the equivalence of the trace rule and the
probability rule of this article see subsection V.E.) For
brevity, we’ll utilize the state vector |φ〉 instead of the
event |φ〉〈φ | throughout.
All derivations of Born’s rule from envariance in the lit-
erature are restricted to eigen-states ( ρ |φ〉 = r |φ〉, r
a positive number). Four of the cited commentators of
Zurek’s argument (I have failed to get in touch with Fine)
have pointed out to me that the restriction can be un-
derstood as natural in the context of (previous) system-
environment interaction, which has led to decoherence
(see [6], Sec. IIIE4), or if one takes the relative-state (or
many-worlds) view, where the ”observer” is so entangled
with the system in the measurement that the restriction
covers the general case (cf [7] and see the first quotation
in subsection IV.A).
It is the second and basic aim of this investigation to
follow Zurek’s argument in a general and precise form
using the full power of envariance, and to complete the
argument to obtain the probability rule, i. e., the formula
〈φ | ρ |φ〉, beyond the approach in terms of the Schmidt
decomposition (used in the literature).
In the first subsection of the next section a precise
and detailed presentation of the Schmidt decomposition
and of its more specific forms, the canonical Schmidt
decomposition, and the strong Schmidt decomposition
is given. In this last, most specific form, the antiuni-
tary correlation operator Ua , the sole correlation en-
tity inherent in a given bipartite state vector (introduced
in previous work [8]) is made use of. It is the entity
that turns the Schmidt canonical decomposition into the
strong Schmidt decomposition, which is complete and
precise. This entity is lacking in almost all examples of
the use of the Schmidt decomposition in the literature.
(For an alternative approach to the correlation opera-
tor via the antilinear operator representation of bipartite
state vectors see section 2 in [9].) Twin unitaries, i. e.,
opposite-subsystem unitary operators that act equally on
a given bipartite state vector, which are hence equivalent
to envariance, are analysed in detail, and the group of all
2pairs of them is derived.
There is another derivation of the full set of envariance
in the recent literature [10]. It is algebraic, i. e., in terms
of matrices and suitable numbers, whereas the approach
of this study is geometrical, i. e., it is in terms of state
space decompositions and suitable maps.
In the second subsection of the next section connection
between twin unitaries and twin Hermitians, i. e., so-
called twin observables, studied in detail in pure bipartite
states in previous articles [8], [11], is established. In the
last subsection of the next section a possibility to extend
the notion of twin unitaries to mixed bipartite states is
shortly discussed. Extension to twin Hermitians in mixed
states was accomplished in previous work [12].
The second and third subsections of section II are
not necessary for reading section III, in which, following
Zurek, a complete argument of obtaining the probability
rule is presented with the help of the group of all pairs of
twin unitaries and distance in the Hilbert space of linear
Hilbert-Schmidt operators.
In section IV., each of the four re-derivations of Born’s
rule from envariance, and Zurek’s most mature Physical
Review article on the subject, are glossed over and quo-
tations from them are commented upon from the point
of view of the version presented in section III.
In concluding remarks of the last section the main
points of this work are summed up and commented upon.
II. MATHEMATICAL INTERLUDE: STRONG
SCHMIDT DECOMPOSITION AND TWIN
UNITARIES
The main investigation is in the first subsection.
A. Pure-state twin unitaries
We take a completely arbitrary bipartite state vector
| Ψ 〉12 as given. It is an arbitrary normalized vector
in H1 ⊗ H2, where the factor spaces are finite- or
infinite-dimensional complex separable Hilbert spaces.
The statements are, as a rule, asymmetric in the roles
of the two factor spaces. But, as it is well known, for
every general asymmetric statement, also its symmetric
one, obtained by exchanging the roles of 1 and 2,
is valid. We call an orthonormal complete basis simply
”basis”.
The natural framework for the Schmidt decomposition
is general expansion in a factor-space basis.
Let {|m〉1 : ∀m} be an arbitrary basis in H1. Then
there exists a unique expansion
|Ψ〉12 =
∑
m
|m〉1 |m〉
′
2, (2a)
where the generalized expansion coefficients {| m 〉′2 :
∀m} are elements of the opposite factor space H2,
and they depend only on |Ψ〉12 and the corresponding
basis vectors |m〉1, and not on the entire basis.
The generalized expansion coefficients are evaluated
making use of the partial scalar product:
∀m : |m〉′2 = 〈m |1|Ψ〉12. (2b)
The partial scalar product is evaluated expanding
| Ψ 〉12 in arbitrary bases {| k 〉1 : ∀k} ⊂ H1,
{| l〉2 : ∀l} ⊂ H2, and by utilizing the ordinary scalar
products in the composite and the factor spaces:
|Ψ〉12 =
∑
k
∑
l
(
〈k |1 〈l |2|Ψ〉12
)
|k〉1 | l〉2. (2c)
Then (2b) reads
∀m : |m〉′2 =
∑
l
(∑
k
〈m|1|k〉1〈k|1 〈l|2|Ψ〉12
)
|l〉2, (2d)
and the lhs is independent of the choice of the bases in
the factor spaces.
Proof is straightforward.
Now we define a Schmidt decomposition. It is well
known and much used in the literature. It is only a
springboard for the theory presented in this section.
If in the expansion (2a) besides the basis vectors |m〉1
also the ”expansion coefficients” |m〉′2 are orthogonal,
then one speaks of a Schmidt decomposition. It is usu-
ally written in terms of normalized second-factor-space
vectors {|m〉2 : ∀m}:
|Ψ〉12 =
∑
m
αm |m〉1 |m〉2, (3a)
where αm are complex numbers, and ∀m : |m〉1 and
| m〉2 are referred to as partners in a pair of Schmidt
states.
The term ”Schmidt decomposition” can be replaced
by ”Schmidt expansion” or ”Schmidt form”. To be
consistent and avoid confusion, we’ll stick to the first
term throughout.
Expansion (2a) is a Schmidt decomposition if and only
if the first-factor-space basis {|m〉1 : ∀m} is an eigen-
basis of the corresponding reduced density operator ρ1,
where
ρs ≡ trs′
(
|Ψ〉12〈Ψ |12
)
, s, s′ = 1, 2, s 6= s′, (4)
and trs is the partial trace over Hs.
Next we define a more specific and more useful form
of the Schmidt decomposition. It is called canonical
Schmidt decomposition.
The non-trivial phase factors of the non-zero coeffi-
cients αm in (3a) can be absorbed either in the basis
vectors in H1 in (3a) or in those in H2 (or partly
3the former and partly the latter). If in a Schmidt de-
composition (3a) all non-zero αm are non-negative real
numbers, then we write instead of (3a), the following de-
composition
|Ψ〉12 =
∑
i
r
1/2
i | i〉1 | i〉2, (3b)
and we confine the sum to non-zero terms (one is re-
minded of this by the replacement of the index m by
i in this notation). Relation (3b) is called a canonical
Schmidt decomposition. (The term ”canonical” reminds
of the form of (3b), i. e., of ∀i : r
1/2
i > 0. )
Needless to say that every |Ψ〉12 can be written as
a canonical Schmidt decomposition.
Each canonical Schmidt decomposition (3b) is accom-
panied by the spectral forms of the reduced density oper-
ators:
ρs =
∑
i
ri | i〉s〈i |s, s = 1, 2. (5a, b)
(The same eigenvalues ri appear both in (3b) and in
(5a,b).)
One should note that the topologically closed ranges
R¯(ρs), s = 1, 2 (subspaces) of the reduced density oper-
ators ρs, s = 1, 2 are equally dimensional. The range-
projectors are
Qs =
∑
i
| i〉s〈i |s, s = 1, 2. (5c, d)
The two reduced density operators have equal eigenvalues
{ri : ∀i} (including equal possible degeneracies).
One has a canonical Schmidt decomposition (3b) if and
only if the decomposition is bi-orthonormal and all ex-
pansion coefficients are positive.
Proof of these claims is straightforward.
It is high time we introduce the sole entanglement en-
tity inherent in any bipartite state vector, which is lack-
ing from both forms of Schmidt decomposition discussed
so far. It is an antiunitary map that takes the closed
range R¯(ρ1) onto the symmetrical entity R¯(ρ2). (If
the ranges are finite-dimensional, they are ipso facto
closed, i. e., they are subspaces.) The map is called the
correlation operator, and denoted by the symbol Ua [8],
[11].
If a canonical Schmidt decomposition (3b) is given,
then the two orthonormal bases of equal power {| i〉1 :
∀i} and {|i〉2 : ∀i} define an antiunitary, i. e., antilin-
ear and unitary operator Ua, the correlation operator
- the sole correlation entity inherent in the given state
vector |Ψ〉12:
∀i : | i〉2 ≡
(
Ua | i〉1
)
2
. (6a)
The correlation operator Ua, mapping R¯(ρ1) onto
R¯(ρ2), is well defined by (6a) and by the additional
requirements of antilinearity (complex conjugation of
numbers, coefficients in a linear combination) and by
continuity (if the bases are infinite). (Both these require-
ments follow from that of antiunitarity.) Preservation of
every scalar product up to complex conjugation, which,
by definition, makes Ua antiunitary, is easily seen to
follow from (6a) and the requirements of antilinearity
and continuity because Ua takes an orthonormal basis
into another orthonormal one.
Though the canonical Schmidt decompositions (3b) are
non-unique (even if ρs, s = 1, 2 are non-degenerate in
their positive eigenvalues, there is the non-uniqueness of
the phase factors of | i 〉1 ), the correlation operator
Ua is uniquely implied by a given bipartite state vector
|Ψ〉12.
This claim is proved in Appendix A.
The uniqueness of Ua when | Ψ〉12 is given is a
slight compensation for the trouble one has treating an
antilinear operator. (Though the difficulty is more psy-
chological than practical, because all that distinguishes
an antiunitary operator from a unitary one is its antilin-
earity - it complex-conjugates the numbers in any linear
combination - and its property that it preserves the abso-
lute value, but complex-conjugates every scalar product.)
The full compensation comes from the usefulness of Ua.
Once the orthonormal bases {| i 〉1 : ∀i} and
{| i〉2 : ∀i} of a canonical Schmidt decomposition (3b)
are given, one can write
Ua =
∑
i
| i〉2K〈i |1, (6b)
where K denotes complex conjugation. For instance,
Ua |φ〉1 =
∑
i
(〈i |1|φ〉1)
∗ | i〉2. (6c)
We finally introduce the most specific form of Schmidt
decomposition. We call it a strong Schmidt decomposi-
tion.
If one rewrites (3b) in terms of the correlation operator
by substituting (6a) in (3b), then it takes the form
|Ψ〉12 =
∑
i
r
1/2
i | i〉1
(
Ua | i〉1
)
2
. (3c)
This is called a strong Schmidt decomposition.
If a strong Schmidt decomposition (3c) is written
down, then it can be viewed in two opposite ways:
(i) as a given bipartite state vector |Ψ〉12 defining its
two inherent entities, the reduced density operator ρ1
in spectral form (cf (5a)) and the correlation operator
Ua (cf (6a)), both relevant for the entanglement in the
state vector; and
(ii) as a given pair (ρ1, Ua) ( Ua mapping antiuni-
tarily R¯(ρ1) onto some equally dimensional subspace
of H2 ) defining a bipartite state vector |Ψ〉12.
4The second view of the strong Schmidt decomposition
allows a systematic generation or classification of all
state vectors in H1 ⊗H2 (cf [13]).
One has
ρ2 = Uaρ1U
−1
a Q2, ρ1 = U
−1
a ρ2UaQ1 (7a, b)
(cf (6a) and (5a,b)). Thus, the reduced density operators
are, essentially, ”images” of each other via the correlation
operator. (The term ”essentially” points to the fact that
the dimensions of the null spaces are independent of each
other.) This property is called twin operators.
When one takes into account the eigen-subspaces
R(Qjs) of ρs corresponding to (the common) distinct
positive eigenvalues rj of ρs, where Q
j
s projects
onto the rj−eigen-subspace, s = 1, 2, then one ob-
tains a geometrical view of the entanglement in a given
state |Ψ〉12 in terms of the so-called correlated subsys-
tem picture [8]:
R¯(ρs) =
⊕∑
j
R(Qjs), s = 1, 2, (7c, d)
where ”⊕ ” denotes an orthogonal sum of subspaces,
∀j : R(Qj2) = UaR(Q
j
1), R(Q
j
1) = U
−1
a R(Q
j
2),
(7e, f)
and, of course,
R¯(ρ2) = UaR¯(ρ1), R¯(ρ1) = U
−1
a R¯(ρ2). (7g, h)
In words, the correlation operator makes not only the
ranges of the reduced density operators ”images” of each
other, but also the positive-eigenvalue eigen-subspaces.
Equivalently, the correlation operator makes the eigen-
decompositions of the ranges ”images” of each other.
One should note that all positive-eigenvalue eigen-
subspaces R(Qjs) are finite dimensional because∑
i ri = 1 (a consequence of the normalization of
|Ψ〉12 ), and hence no positive-eigenvalue can have infi-
nite degeneracy.
The correlated subsystem picture of a given bipartite
state vector is very useful in investigating remote influ-
ences (as a way to understand physically the entangle-
ment in the composite state) (see [11], and [9]).
We will need the correlated subsystem picture of
| Ψ〉12 for the basic result of this section given below:
the second theorem on twin unitaries. Namely, we now
introduce this term for the pairs (U1, U2) following a
long line of research on analogous Hermitian operators
(see the last mentioned references and the next subsec-
tion).
If one has two opposite factor-space unitaries u1 and
u2 that, on defining U1 ≡ (u1 ⊗ 12) and U2 ≡ (11 ⊗
u2), act equally on the given composite state vector
U1 |Ψ〉12 = U2 |Ψ〉12, (8a)
then one speaks of twin unitaries (unitary twin opera-
tors). They give another, equivalent, view of envariance
(see the Introduction), since, rewriting (8a) as
U−12 U1 |Ψ〉12 =|Ψ〉12, (8b)
one can see that U−12 ”untransforms” the action of
U1 (cf (1)).
It is easy to see that U1 | Ψ 〉12〈 Ψ |12 U
−1
1 =
U2 |Ψ〉12〈Ψ |12 U
−1
2 is equivalent to
U1 |Ψ〉12 = e
iλU2 |Ψ〉12, (8c)
where λ ∈R1. This does not diminish the usefulness
of definition (8a), because, if (8c) is valid for a pair
(U1, U2), then one only has to replace these operators
by (U1, e
iλU2) , and the latter satisfy (8a).
Henceforth, we will write Us both for us, s = 1, 2,
and for (11 ⊗ u2) or (u1 ⊗ 12) (cf (1)).
First Theorem on twin unitaries. Opposite factor-
space unitaries U1 and U2 are twin unitaries if and
only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) they are symmetry operators of the corresponding
density operators:
UsρsU
−1
s = ρs, s = 1, 2, (8d, e)
and
(ii) they are the correlation-operator ”images” of each
other’s inverse. Writing Q⊥s ≡ 1s −Qs, s = 1, 2, this
reads:
U2 = UaU
−1
1 U
−1
a Q2 + U2Q
⊥
2 , (8f)
U1 = U
−1
a U
−1
2 UaQ1 + U1Q
⊥
1 . (8g)
(The second terms on the rhs of (8f) and (8g) mean
that Us is arbitrary in the null space R(Q
⊥
s ) of
ρs, s = 1, 2. )
Proof. Necessity.
U1ρ1 = U1tr2
(
|Ψ〉12〈Ψ |12
)
=
tr2
(
U1 |Ψ〉12〈Ψ |12
)
= tr2
(
(U2 |Ψ〉12)〈Ψ |12
)
=
tr2
(
(|Ψ〉12〈Ψ |12)U2
)
= tr2
(
|Ψ〉12〈Ψ |12 U1
)
= ρ1U1.
Symmetrically one derives (8e).
Applying the definition of twin unitaries in the envari-
ance form (8b) to |Ψ〉12, written as a strong Schmidt
decomposition (3c), one obtains
∑
i
r
1/2
i
(
U1 |i〉1
)
U−12
(
Ua |i〉1
)
2
=
∑
i
r
1/2
i |i〉1
(
Ua |i〉1
)
2
.
5On account of the unitary property of U1 and U
−1
2 ,
the lhs is bi-orthonormal, hence also {U1 | i〉1 : ∀i} is
an eigen-basis of ρ1 in R¯(ρ1) due to the necessary
and sufficient condition for a Schmidt decomposition (see
above (4)). Then, one can rewrite the lhs as the strong
Schmidt decomposition with this basis. Thus, one ob-
tains
∑
i
r
1/2
i
(
U1 | i〉1
)
U−12
(
Ua | i〉1
)
2
=
∑
i
r
1/2
i
(
U1 | i〉1
)(
UaU1 | i〉1
)
2
.
Since the generalized expansion coefficients are unique,
one concludes
U−12 UaQ1 = UaU1Q1
(cf (5c)). One has U1 = U1Q1 + U1Q
⊥
1 as a conse-
quence of relation (8d), which has been proved already,
and which implies commutation with all eigen-projectors
Qj1, and hence also with Q1 =
∑
j Q
j
1 (cf (7c)). There-
fore, the obtained relation amounts to the same as (8g).
The symmetrical argument establishes (8f). (Note that
here one starts with the decomposition that is symmetri-
cal to (3c), in which an eigen-sub-basis of ρ2 is chosen
spanning R¯(ρ2), and Ua is replaced by U
−1
a . )
Sufficiency. Assuming validity of (8d), it immedi-
ately follows that besides {| i 〉1 : ∀i} (cf (3c)) also
{U1 | i〉1 : ∀i} is an eigen-sub-basis of ρ1 spanning
R¯(ρ1). Hence, we can write a strong Schmidt decompo-
sition as follows:
|Ψ〉12 =
∑
i
(
U1 | i〉1
)(
UaU1 | i〉1
)
2
.
Substituting here (8g) in the second factors,
|Ψ〉12 =
∑
i
(
U1 | i〉1
)(
U−12 Ua | i〉1
)
2
ensues. In view of the strong Schmidt decomposition
(3c), this amounts to | Ψ〉12 = U1U
−1
2 | Ψ〉12, i. e.,
(8b), which is equivalent to (8a), is obtained. ✷
It is straightforward to show (along the lines of the
proof just presented) that the twin unitaries are also
responsible for the non-uniqueness of strong (or of
canonical) Schmidt decomposition. To put this more
precisely, besides (3c) (besides (3b)) all other strong
Schmidt decompositions (canonical Schmidt decompo-
sitions) are obtained by replacing {| i〉1 : ∀i} in (3c)
by {U1 | i〉1 : ∀i}, where [U1, ρ1] = 0 (by replacing
{|i〉1 |i〉2 : ∀i} in (3b) by {
(
U1 |i〉1
)(
U−12 |i〉2
)
: ∀i},
where [Us, ρs] = 0, s = 1, 2, and (8f) is satisfied).
The set of all pairs of twin unitaries (U1, U2)
is a group, if one defines the composition law by
(U ′1, U
′
2) × (U1, U2) ≡ (U
′
1U1, U2U
′
2) (note the inverted
order in H2 ), and taking the inverse turns out to be
(U1, U2)
−1 = (U−11 , U
−1
2 ). This claim is proved in Ap-
pendix B.
Having in mind the subsystem picture (7a)-(7h) of
|Ψ〉12, it is immediately seen that the first theorem on
twin unitaries can be cast in the following equivalent
form.
Second Theorem on twin unitaries. The group of
all twin unitaries (U1, U2) consists of all pairs of oppo-
site factor-space unitaries that reduce in every positive-
eigenvalue eigen-subspace R(Qjs), s = 1, 2 (cf (7c,d)),
and the reducees are connected by relations (8f,g) mu-
tatis mutandis, or, equivalently, by (8f,g) in which Qs
is replaced by Qjs, s = 1, 2, and this is valid simulta-
neously for all j−components.
In the language of formulae, we have all pairs of uni-
taries (U1, U2) that can be written in the form
Us =
∑
j
U jsQ
j
s + UsQ
⊥
s , s = 1, 2, (9a, b)
∀j : U j2Q
j
2 = Ua(U
j
1 )
−1U−1a Q
j
2, (9c)
U j1Q
j
1 = U
−1
a (U
j
2 )
−1UaQ
j
1. (9d)
Note that within each positive-eigenvalue subspace
R(Qjs) of ρs, s = 1, 2, all unitaries are encompassed
(but not independently, cf (9c,d)). This will be impor-
tant in the application in the next section.
The next two (short) subsections round out the study
of twin unitaries. The reader who is primarily interested
in the argument leading to the probability rule is advised
to skip them.
B. Connection with twin Hermitians
There is a notion closely connected with twin unitaries
in a pure bipartite state: it is that of twin Hermitians (in
that state). If a pair (H1, H2) of opposite factor-space
Hermitian operators commute with the corresponding re-
duced density operators, and
H2 = UaH1U
−1
a Q2+H2Q
⊥
2 , H1 = U
−1
a H2UaQ1+H1Q
⊥
1
(10a, b)
is valid then one speaks of twin Hermitian operators.
(Relations (10a,b), in analogy with (8f,g), state that the
reducees in the ranges of the reduced density operators
are ”images” of each other, and the reducees in the null
spaces are completely arbitrary.)
One should note that twin unitaries are, actually, de-
fined analogously. To see this, one has to replace U−1s
by U †s in (8f,g), and Hs by H
†
s , s = 1, 2, in
(10a,b).
6Twin Hermitians have important physical meaning
[11], [9]. But here we are only concerned with their con-
nection with twin unitaries.
If Us, s = 1 or s = 2 are symmetry operators of
the corresponding reduced density operators, i. e., if they
commute, then there exist Hermitian operators that also
commute with the latter and
Us = e
iHsQs + UsQ
⊥
s , s = 1 or s = 2 (11a, b)
is valid. And vice versa, if Hs, s = 1 or s = 2
are Hermitians that commute with the corresponding re-
duced density operators, then there exist analogous uni-
taries given by (11a,b). (The unitary and Hermitian re-
ducees in the ranges determine each other in (11a,b), and
the reducees in the null spaces are arbitrary.)
The latter claim is obvious. But to see that also the
former is valid, one should take into account that commu-
tation with the corresponding reduced density operator
implies reduction in each (finite dimensional) positive-
eigenvalue eigen-subspace (cf (7c,d)). Then one can take
the spectral form of each reducee of Us , and (11a,b) be-
comes obvious (and the corresponding reducees of Hs
are unique if their eigenvalues are required to be, e. g.,
in the intervals [0, 2pi). )
The connection (11a,b), which goes in both directions,
can be extended to twin operators.
If (U1, U2) are twin unitaries, then (11a,b) (with
”or” replaced by ”and”) determine corresponding twin
Hermitians, and vice versa, if (H1, H2) are twin
Hermitians, then the same relations determine corre-
sponding twin unitaries.
C. Mixed states
If ρ12 is a mixed bipartite density operator, then we
no longer have the correlation operator Ua and the
correlated subsystem picture (7a)-(7h). Nevertheless, in
some cases twin Hermitians, defined by
H1ρ12 = H2ρ12 (12a, b)
have been found [12]. (Their physical meaning was anal-
ogous to that in the pure-state case.) It was shown that
(12a,b) implied
[Hs, ρs] = 0, s = 1, 2, (12c, d)
where ρs are again the reduced density operators. (Un-
like in the case when ρ12 is a pure state, in the mixed-
state case the commutations (12c,d) are not sufficient for
possessing a twin operator.)
Relations (12c,d), in turn, again imply reduction of
Hs in every positive-eigenvalue eigen-subspace R(Q
j
s)
of ρs, s = 1, 2, but now the dimensions of the corre-
sponding, i. e., equal-j, eigen-subspaces are, unlike in
(7c,d), completely independent of each other (but finite
dimensional). In each of them, relations (11a,b) (with
”and” instead of ”or”) hold true, and define twin uni-
taries satisfying (8a) with ρ12 instead of |Ψ〉12.
Thus, in some cases, the concept of envariance can be
extended to mixed states.
III. BORN’S RULE FROM TWIN UNITARIES
The forthcoming argument is given in 5 stages; the first
3 stages are an attempt to tighten up and make more ex-
plicit, Zurek’s argument [1], [14], [15], [16] by somewhat
changing the approach, and utilizing the group of all pairs
of twin unitaries (presented in the first subsection of the
preceding section). The change that is introduced is, ac-
tually, a generalization. Zurek’s ”environment”, which,
after the standard interaction with the system under con-
sideration, establishes special, measurement-like correla-
tions with it, is replaced. Instead, an entangled bipar-
tite pure state |Ψ〉12 is taken, where subsystem 1 is
the system under consideration, and 2 is some opposite
subsystem with an infinite dimensional state space H2.
We shall try to see to what extent and how the quantum
probability rule follows from the quantum correlations, i.
e., the entanglement in |Ψ〉12.
The forth stage is new. It is meant to extend the ar-
gument to states | φ〉1 which are not eigenvectors of
the reduced density operator ρ1 ≡ tr2
(
|Ψ〉12〈Ψ |12
)
.
The fifth stage is also new. It extends the argument to
isolated (not correlated) systems.
Let |Ψ〉12 be an arbitrary entangled bipartite state
vector. We assume that subsystems 1 and 2 are not
interacting. (They may have interacted in the past and
thus have created the entanglement. But it also may have
been created in some other way; e. g., by an external
field as the spatial-spin entanglement in a Stern-Gerlach
apparatus.)
We want to obtain the probability rule in subsystem
1. By this we assume that there exist probabilities, and
we do not investigate why this is so; we only want to
obtain their form.
The FIRST STIPULATION is: (a) Though the given
pure state |Ψ〉12 determines all properties in the com-
posite system, therefore also all those of subsystem 1,
the latter must be determined actually by the subsystem
alone. This is, by (vague) definition, what is meant by
local properties.
(b) There exist local or subsystem probabilities of all
elementary events | φ〉1〈φ |1, | φ〉1 ∈ H1. (As it has
been stated, we will write the event shortly as the state
vector that determines it.)
Since | Ψ 〉12 ∈
(
H1 ⊗ H2
)
, subsystem 1 is
somehow connected with the state space H1, but it
is not immediately clear precisely how. Namely, since
we start out without the probability rule, the reduced
7density operator ρ1 ≡ tr2
(
| Ψ 〉12〈Ψ |12
)
, though
mathematically at our disposal, is yet devoid of physical
meaning. We need a precise definition of what is local
or what is the subsystem state. We will achieve this
gradually, and thus ρ1 will be gradually endowed with
the standard physical meaning.
The SECOND STIPULATION is that subsystem or
local properties must not be changeable by remote action,
i. e., by applying a second-subsystem unitary U2 to
| Ψ 〉12 or any unitary U23 applied to the opposite
subsystem with an ancilla (subsystem 3 ).
If this were not so, then there would be no sense in
calling the properties at issue ”local” and not ”global”
in the composite state. We are dealing with a definition
of local or subsystem properties. By the first stipulation,
the probability rule that we are endeavoring to obtain
should be local.
The most important part of the precise mathematical
formulation of the second stipulation is in terms of twin
unitaries (cf (8a)). No local unitary U1 that has a
twin U2 must be able to change any local property.
Stage one. We know from the First Theorem on twin
unitaries that such local unitaries U1 are all those that
commute with ρ1 (cf (8d)) and no others. In this way
the mathematical entity ρ1 is already beginning to ob-
tain some physical relevance for local properties.
We know from the Second Theorem on twin unitaries
that we are dealing with U1 that are orthogonal sums of
arbitrary unitaries acting within the positive-eigenvalue
eigen-subspaces of ρ1 (cf (9a)).
Let |φ〉1 and |φ〉
′
1 be any two distinct state vectors
from one and the same positive-eigenvalue eigen-subspace
R(Qj1) of ρ1. Evidently, there exists a unitary U
j
1
in this subspace that maps | φ 〉1 into | φ 〉
′
1, and,
adding to it orthogonally any other eigen-subspace uni-
taries (cf (9a)), one obtains a unitary U1 in H1 that
has a twin, i. e., the action of which can be given rise
to from the remote second subsystem. (”Remote” here
refers in a figurative way to lack of interaction. Or, to use
Zurek’s terms, 1 and 2 are assumed to be ”dynam-
ically decoupled” and ”causally disconnected”.) Thus,
we conclude that the two first-subsystem states at issue
must have the same probability.
In other words, arguing ab contrario, if the probabil-
ities of the two distinct states were distinct, then, by
remote action (by applying the twin unitary U2 of the
above unitary U1 to |Ψ〉12 ), one could transform one
of the states into the other, which would locally mean
changing the probability value without any local cause.
Putting our conclusion differently, all eigen-vectors of
ρ1 that correspond to one and the same eigenvalue
rj > 0 have one and the same probability in | Ψ〉12.
Let us denote by p(Qj1) the probability of the, in gen-
eral, composite event that is mathematically represented
by the eigen-projector Qj1 of ρ1 corresponding to
rj (cf (9a)), and let the multiplicity of rj (the di-
mension of R(Qj1) ) be dj . Then the probability of
| φ〉1〈φ |1 is p(Q
j
1)/dj . To see this, one takes a ba-
sis {| φk 〉1 : k = 1, 2, . . . , dj} spanning R(Q
j
1), or,
equivalently, Qj1 =
∑dj
k=1 | φk 〉1〈φk |1, with, e. g.,
|φk=1〉1 ≡|φ〉1. Further, one makes use of the additivity
rule of probability: probability of the sum of mutually ex-
clusive (orthogonal) events (projectors) equals the same
sum of the probabilities of the event terms in it.
Actually, the σ-additivity rule of probability is the
THIRD STIPULATION. It requires that the probability
of every finite or infinite sum of exclusive events be equal
to the same sum of the probabilities of the event terms.
We could not proceed without it (cf subsections V.E and
V.F). The need for infinite sums will appear four passages
below.
In the special case, when ρ1 has only one positive
eigenvalue of multitude d (the dimension of the range
of ρ1 ), the probability of | φ〉1 is p(Q1)/d (where
Q1 is the range projector of ρ1. ) To proceed, we need
to evaluate p(Q1).
To this purpose, we make the FOURTH STIPULA-
TION: Every state vector |φ〉1 that belongs to the null
space of ρ1 (or, equivalently, when |φ〉1〈φ|1 , acting on
| Ψ〉12, gives zero) has probability zero. (The twin uni-
taries do not influence each other in the respective null
spaces, cf (9a,b). Hence, this assumption is independent
of the second stipulation.)
Justification for the fourth stipulation lies in Zurek’s
original framework. Namely, if the opposite subsystem
is the environment, which establishes measurement-like
entanglement, then the Schmidt states, e. g., the above
eigen-sub-basis, obtain partners in a Schmidt decompo-
sition (cf (3a)), and this leads to measurement. States
from the null space do not appear in this, and cannot
give a positive measurement result.
One has 11 = Q1 +
∑
l | l〉1〈l |1, where {| l〉1 : ∀l}
is a basis spanning the null space of ρ1, which may be
infinite dimensional. Then, p(Q1) = p(11) = 1 follows
from the third postulate ( σ-additivity) and the fourth
one. Finally, in the above special case of only one positive
eigenvalue of ρ1, the probability of | φ〉1 ∈ R(ρ1) is
1/d, which equals the only eigenvalue of ρ1 in this case.
Our next aim is to derive p(Qj1) in a more general
case.
Stage two. In this stage we confine ourselves to com-
posite state vectors |Ψ〉12 (i) that have finite entangle-
ment, i. e., the first-subsystem reduced density operator
of which has a finite-dimensional range; (ii) such that
each eigenvalue rj of ρ1 is a rational number.
We rewrite the eigenvalues with an equal denomina-
tor: ∀j : rj = mj/M. Since
∑
j djrj = 1, one has∑
j djmj = M ( dj is the degeneracy or multiplicity
of rj ).
Now we assume that |Ψ〉12 has a special structure:
(i) The opposite subsystem 2 is bipartite in turn,
hence we replace the notation 2 by (2 + 3), and
8|Ψ〉12 by |Φ〉123.
(ii) a) We introduce a two-indices eigen-sub-basis of
ρ1 spanning the closed range R¯(ρ1) : {|j, kj〉1 : kj =
1, 2, . . . , dj ; ∀j} so that the sub-basis is, as one says,
adapted to the spectral decomposition ρ1 =
∑
j rjQ
j
1
of the reduced density operator, i. e., ∀j : Qj1 =∑dj
kj=1
|j, kj〉1〈j, kj |1 .
b) We assume that H2 is at least M dimen-
sional, and we introduce a basis {| j, kj , lj 〉2 : lj =
1, 2, . . . ,mj; kj = 1, 2, . . . , dj ; ∀j} spanning a subspace
of H2.
c) We assume that also H3 is at least M dimen-
sional, and we introduce a basis {| j, kj , lj 〉3 : lj =
1, 2, . . . ,mj; kj = 1, 2, . . . , dj ; ∀j} spanning a subspace
of H3.
d) Finally, we define via a canonical Schmidt decom-
position 1 + (2 + 3) (cf (3b) and (5a)):
|Φ〉123 ≡
∑
j
dj∑
kj=1
(mj/M)
1/2
[
|j, kj〉1⊗
( mj∑
lj=1
(1/mj)
1/2 |j, kj , lj〉2 |j, kj , lj〉3
)]
. (13a)
Equivalently,
|Φ〉123 ≡
∑
j
dj∑
kj=1
mj∑
lj=1
(1/M)1/2 |j, kj〉1 |j, kj , lj〉2 |j, kj , lj〉3.
(13b)
Viewing (13b) as a state vector of a bipartite (1 +
2) + 3 system, we see that it is a canonical Schmidt de-
composition (cf (3b)). Having in mind (5a), and utilizing
the final conclusion of stage one, we can state that the
probability of each state vector | j, kj 〉1 | j, kj , lj 〉2 is
1/M.
On the other hand, we can view (13a) as a state vec-
tor of the bipartite system 1 + (2 + 3) in the form of
a canonical Schmidt decomposition. One can see that
∀j, (Qj1 ⊗ 12) and
∑dj
kj=1
∑mj
lj=1
| j, kj 〉1〈 j, kj |1
⊗ | j, kj , lj〉2〈j, kj , lj |2 act equally on |Φ〉123. On the
other hand, it is easily seen that the former projector can
be written as a sum of the latter sum of projectors and
of an orthogonal projector that acts as zero on |Φ〉123,
and therefore has zero probability on account of stipu-
lation four. Thus, (Qj1 ⊗ 12) and the above sum have
equal probabilities, which is
p(Qj1 ⊗ 12) = djmj/M. (14)
As it was concluded in Stage one, the probability of
any state vector | φ〉1 in R(Q
j
1) is p(Q
j
1)/dj . The
projectors Qj1 and (Q
j
1 ⊗ 12) stand for the same
event (viewed locally and more globally respectively),
hence they have the same probability in |Φ〉123. Thus,
p(| φ〉1〈φ |1) = mj/M = rj , i. e., it equals the corre-
sponding eigenvalue of ρ1.
We see that also the eigenvalues, not just the eigen-
subspaces, i. e., the entire operator ρ1 is relevant for
the local probability. At this stage we do not yet know
if we are still lacking some entity or entities. We’ll write
X for the possible unknown.
How do we justify replacing |Ψ〉12 by |Φ〉123? In
the state space (H2 ⊗H3) there is a pair of orthonor-
mal sub-bases of d =
∑
j dj vectors that appear in
(13a) (cf (15)). Evidently, there exists a unitary opera-
tor U23 that maps the Schmidt-state partners |j, kj〉2
of | j, kj 〉1 in | Ψ〉12 tensorically multiplied with an
initial state |φ0〉3 into the vectors:
∀kj , ∀j : U23 : |j, kj〉2 |φ0〉3 −→
mj∑
lj=1
(1/mj)
1/2 |j, kj , lj〉2 |j, kj , lj〉3. (15)
On account of the second stipulation, any such U23,
which transforms by interaction an ancilla (subsystem
3 ) in state |φ0〉3 and subsystem 2 as it is in |Ψ〉12
into the (2 + 3)-subsystem state as it is | Φ〉123, does
not change any local property of subsystem 1. Hence,
it does not change the probabilities either.
Stage three. We make the FIFTH STIPULATION:
the sought for probability rule is continuous in ρ1,
i. e., if ρ1 = limn→∞ ρ
n
1 , then p(E1, ρ1, X) =
limn→∞ p(E1, ρ
n
1 , X), for every event (projector) E1.
(We assume that X, if it exists, does not change in the
convergence process.)
Let ρ1 =
∑J
j=1 rjQ
j
1, J a natural number, be the
spectral form of an arbitrary density operator with finite-
dimensional range. One can write ρ1 = limn→∞ ρ
n
1 ,
where ρn1 =
∑J
j=1 r
n
j Q
j
1, with rj = limn→∞ r
n
j , j =
1, 2. . . . , J, and all rnj are rational numbers. (Note
that the eigen-projectors are assumed to be the same
all over the convergence.) Then the required continu-
ity gives for an eigen-vector | rj0 〉 of ρ1 corre-
sponding to the eigenvalue rj0 : p(| rj0 〉, ρ1, X) =
limn→∞ p(| rj0 〉, ρ
n
1 , X) = rj0 . This extends the con-
clusion of stage two to all ρ1 with finite-dimensional
ranges, and their eigen-vectors.
Let ρ1 =
∑∞
j=1 rjQ
j
1 have an infinite-dimensional
range. We define ρn1 ≡
∑n
j=1
(
rj/(
∑n
k=1 rk)
)
Qj1.
(Note that we are taking the same eigen-projectors
Qj1. ) Then ρ1 = limn→∞ ρ
n
1 , and for any eigen-vector
|rj0〉 one has p(|rj0〉, ρ1, X) = limn→∞ p(|rj0〉, ρ
n
1 , X) =
limn→∞ rj0/(
∑n
k=1 rk) = rj0 . This extends the conclu-
sion of the preceding stage to all reduced density operators
and their eigen-vectors.
As a final remark about stage three, we point
out that the continuity postulated is meant with
respect to the so-called strong operator topology
9in Hilbert space [17]. Thus, if ρ = limn→∞ ρn,
then, and only then, for every vector | ψ 〉 one has
ρ | ψ〉 = limn→∞ ρn | ψ〉. This means, as well known,
that limn→∞ ||ρ | ψ 〉 − ρn | ψ 〉|| = 0 (where the
”distance” in the Hilbert space is made use of).
Stage four. The result of the preceding stages can be
put as follows: If ρ1 |φ〉1 = r |φ〉1, then the probability
is
p(|φ〉1, ρ1) = r = 〈φ |1 ρ1 |φ〉1. (16)
(We have dropped X because we already know that,
as far as eigen-vectors of ρ1 are concerned, nothing is
missing.) Now we wonder what about state vectors in
H1 that are not eigen-vectors of ρ1?
We make the SIXTH STIPULATION: Instead of ρ1,
of which the given state |φ〉1 is not an eigen-state, we
take a different density operator ρ′1 of which |φ〉1 is
an eigenvector, i. e., for which ρ′1 | φ〉1 = r
′ | φ〉1 is
valid, and which is closest to ρ1 as such. We stipulate
that the sought for probability is r′. (We expect that
r′ will be determined by the requirement of ”closest as
such”.)
The idea behind the stipulation is the fact that there
exists non-demolition (or repeatable) measurement, in
which the value (of the measured observable) that has
been obtained is possessed by the system after the mea-
surement, so that an immediate repetition of the same
measurement necessarily gives the same result (it is not
demolished; it can be repeated). There even exists so-
called ideal measurement in which, if the system had a
sharp value of the measured observable before the mea-
surement, then it is not only this value, but the whole
state that is not changed in the measurement. But in
general, the state (the density operator) has to change,
though minimally, in ideal measurement. The point is
that in this change ρ → ρ′ the probability does not
change 〈φ | ρ′ |φ〉 = 〈φ | ρ |φ〉.
To make the requirement of ”closest” more specific, we
make use of a notion of ”distance” in the set of density
operators (acting in H1 ). As known, the set of all lin-
ear Hilbert-Schmidt operators in a complex Hilbert space
is, in turn, a complex Hilbert space itself (cf Appendix
C). All density operators are Hilbert-Schmidt operators.
Every Hilbert space is a distantial space, and ”closest” is
well defined in it.
We are not going to solve the problem of finding the
closest density operator to ρ1 because a related prob-
lem has been solved in previous work of the author [18].
Namely, the fact that | φ〉1 is an eigenvector of ρ
′
1
can be put in the equivalent form of a mixture
ρ′1 = r
′ |φ〉1〈φ |1 +
(1 − r′)
[(
|φ〉1〈φ |1
)⊥
ρ′1
(
|φ〉1〈φ |1
)⊥/
(1 − r′)
]
. (17)
In (17) ρ′1 is a mixture of two states, one in which
|φ〉1〈φ |1 as an observable has the sharp value 1, and
one in which it has the sharp value 0 .
In Ref. [18] it was shown that when a density operator
ρ1 is given, the closest density operator ρ
′
1, among
those that satisfy (17), is:
ρ′1 ≡ 〈φ |1 ρ1 |φ〉1 |φ〉1〈φ |1 +
(
|φ〉1〈φ |1
)⊥
ρ1
(
|φ〉1〈φ |1
)⊥
. (18)
Thus,
r′ = 〈φ |1 ρ1 |φ〉1, (19)
and the same formula (the last expression in (16)) ex-
tends also to the case when |φ〉1 is not an eigenvector
of ρ1.
Incidentally, the requirement of closest ρ′ to ρ un-
der the restriction that the ”closest” is taken among those
density operators that are mixtures of states with sharp
values of the measured observable A =
∑
k akPk (spec-
tral form) defines the Lu¨ders state ρ′ =
∑
k PkρPk
[18]. (It was postulated [19]; and as such it appears in
textbooks [20].) As well known, in ideal measurement
ρ changes to the Lu¨ders state. (In so-called selective
ideal measurement, when one takes the subensemble cor-
responding to a specific result, say, ak0 , the change of
state is ρ → Pk0ρPk0
/
tr(Pk0ρ). This is sometimes
called ”the projection postulate”.)
As a final remark on stage four, one should point out
that ”distance” in the Hilbert space of linear Hilbert-
Schmidt operators also defines a topology, in particular
a convergence of density operators. It is stronger than
the so-called strong operator topology utilized in the
preceding stage. More about this in Appendix C.
Stage five. Finally, we have to find out what should
be the probability rule when ρ is not an improper, but
a proper mixture, i. e., when there are no correlations
with another system. We take first an isolated pure state
|ψ〉.
We start with an infinite sequence of correlated bipar-
tite state vectors {|Ψ12〉
n : n = 1, 2, . . . ,∞} such that,
as far as the reduced density operator is concerned, one
has
∀n : ρn1 = (1− 1/n) |ψ〉1〈ψ |1 +
(
|ψ〉1〈ψ |1
)⊥
ρn1
(
|ψ〉1〈ψ |1
)⊥
, (20)
where | ψ 〉1 actually equals | ψ 〉. (It is well known
that for every density operator ρ1 there exists a state
vector |Ψ〉12 such that ρ1 = tr2
(
|Ψ〉12〈Ψ |12
)
. This
claim is easily proved using the spectral form (5a) of ρ1
and the canonical Schmidt decomposition (3b).) We now
write index 1 because we now do have correlations with
subsystem 2.
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Obviously
|ψ〉1〈ψ |1= lim
n→∞
ρn1 . (21)
According to our fifth stipulation, the probability rule
is continuous in the density operator. Hence,
∀ |φ〉 : p
(
|φ〉, |ψ〉
)
= lim
n→∞
p
(
|φ〉1, ρ
n
1
)
=
lim
n→∞
〈φ |1 ρ
n
1 |φ〉1 = 〈φ |1 limn→∞
ρn1 |φ〉1.
This finally gives
∀ |φ〉 : p
(
|φ〉, |ψ〉
)
= 〈φ |
(
|ψ〉〈ψ |
)
|φ〉 = |〈φ ||ψ〉|2.
(22)
In this way, the same probability rule is extended to iso-
lated pure states.
If ρ is an isolated mixed state, i. e., a proper mixture,
one can take any of its (infinitely many) decompositions
into pure states, say,
ρ =
∑
k
wk |ψk〉〈ψk |,
where wk are the statistical weights ( ∀k : wk >
0;
∑
k wk = 1 ). Then
p
(
|φ〉, ρ
)
=
∑
k
wk〈φ |
(
|ψk〉〈ψk |
)
|φ〉.
This finally gives
p
(
|φ〉, ρ
)
= 〈φ | ρ |φ〉, (23)
extending the same probability rule to mixed isolated
states. (It is obvious that the choice of the above
decomposition into pure states is immaterial. One can
take the spectral decomposition e. g.)
IV. RELATION TO THE LITERATURE
This article comes after 8 studies of thought-provoking
analiticity [1], [14], [15], [16], [2], [3], [4], [5] on Zurek’s
derivation of Born’s rule. It has profited from most of
them.
The purpose of this section is not to review these arti-
cles; the purpose is to contrast some ideas from 5 of these
works with the present version in order to shed more light
on the latter.
A. SCHLOSSHAUER-FINE
For the purpose of a logical order in my comments, I’ll
mess up the order of the quotations from the article of
Schlosshauer and Fine on Zurek’s argument [2].
Schlosshauer and Fine are inspired to define the pre-
cise framework for Zurek’s endeavor and try to justify it
saying (DISCUSSION, (A)):
”Apart from the problem of how to do cos-
mology, we might take a pragmatic point of
view here by stating that any observation of
the events to which we wish to assign prob-
abilities will always require a measurement-
like context that involves an open system in-
teracting with an external observer, and that
therefore the inability of Zurek’s approach to
derive probabilities for a closed, undivided
system should not be considered as a short-
coming of the argument.”
This may well be the case. In the present version, one
views the probability rule as a potential property of the
system. Measurement is something separate; it comes af-
terwards when an observer wants to get cognizance of the
probabilities. The present study is an attempt to view
Zurek’s argument in such a setting of ideas. Incidentally,
in the present version one can no longer speak of an ”in-
ability of Zurek’s approach to derive probabilities for a
closed, undivided system”.
Besides, the ”problem of how to do cosmology” is con-
sidered by many foundationally minded physicists to be
an important problem in modern quantum-mechanical
thinking. After all, interaction with the environment and
decoherence that sets in (a phenomenon to which Zurek
gave an enormous contribution) is primarily observer-
independent (though it may contain an observer), and it
fits well into quantum cosmology. The present study en-
visages Zurek’s argument in a measurement-independent
and observer-independent way.
In their CONCLUDING REMARKS Schlosshauer and
Fine say:
”...a fundamental statement about any prob-
abilistic theory: We cannot derive probabil-
ities from a theory that does not already
contain some probabilistic concept; at some
stage, we need to ”put probabilities in to get
probabilities out”.
In the present version of the theory, a realization of
this pessimistic statement can be seen in the assump-
tion that local probabilities exist at all (in the first
stipulation, (b)), and in the application of additivity
(and σ-additivity) of probability (the third stipulation).
Incidentally, the quoted claim of Schlosshauer and Fine
is perhaps only mildly pessimistic [21]
As a counterpart of the stipulations in the present ver-
sion, Schlosshauer and Fine state (near the end of their
INTRODUCTION):
”...we find that Zurek’s derivation is based at
least on the following assumptions:
(1) The probability for a particular outcome,
i. e., for the occurrence of a specific value
of a measured physical quantity, is identified
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with the probability for the eigenstate of the
measured observable with eigenvalue corre-
sponding to the measured value - an assump-
tion that would follow from the eigenvalue-
eigenstate link.
(2) Probabilities of a system S entangled
with another system E are a function of
the local properties of S only, which are
exclusively determined by the state vector of
the composite system SE .
(3) For a composite state in the Schmidt form
|ψSE〉 =
∑
k λk |sk〉 |ek〉, the probability for
|sk〉 is equal to the probability for |ek〉.
(4) Probabilities associated with a system
S entangled with another system E re-
main unchanged when certain transforma-
tions (namely, Zurek’s ”envariant transforma-
tions”) are applied that only act on E (and
similarly for S and E interchanged).”
Assumption (1) is very important. It is the quantum
logical approach. (See the comment on it in section V.B
.) Assumption (2) is reproduced in the present version as
the first stipulation.
Having in mind the above quotation on ”putting in
and taking out probability”, assumption (3) was care-
fully avoided in the present version, which goes beyond
the Schmidt decomposition. In the approaches that hang
on to the decomposition, and all preceding ones are such,
putting in probability where it is equal to 1 seems un-
avoidable.
As to assumption (4), it is, to my mind, the basic
idea of Zurek’s argument. Though Schlosshauer and
Fine ”consider Zurek’s approach promising” (INTRO-
DUCTION), they feel very unhappy about this basic as-
sumption (DISCUSSION, F2):
”...we do not see why shifting features of E ,
that is, doing something to the environment,
should not alter the ”guess”... an observer of
S would make concerning S-outcomes.
Schlosshauer and Fine point to Zurek’s desire to bol-
ster his argument by a subjective aspect with an observer
who observes only subsystem S, but who is aware
of the composite state vector | Ψ 〉SE . This observer
”makes guesses” and ”attributes likelihood” to state vec-
tors | φ〉S . Schlosshauer and Fine make critical com-
ments on this aspect.
Weighing if the subjective aspect at issue is useful or
even justified is avoided in the present version. It was
assumed that Zurek’s argument can do without it (cf the
comment on Caves’s first-quoted remark about this).
Schlosshauer and Fine finish the quoted passage say-
ing:
”Here, if possible, one would like to see some
further argument (or motivation) for why the
probabilities of one system should be immune
to swaps among the basis states of the other
system.”
Apparently, locality or subsystem-property is a basic
stipulation (the first stipulation in the present version),
i. e., the basic idea how Zurek envisages probability.
Naturally, one may object that it is hindsight, because
we know the probability rule, and it implies the locality
idea.
When thinking of quantum ideas without the prob-
ability rule, as Zurek does, why not try to insert into
them a local probability idea? The motivation lies in our
intuitive expectation to find nature with as many local
properties as possible (to enable us to do physics). After
all, the well known tremendous reaction of the scientific
community to Bell’s theorem dealing with subquantum
locality is an impressive indication of how important lo-
cality is considered to be.
Envariance, or twin unitaries in the present equivalent
formulation, (and broader, see the second stipulation)
provide us with a means to define what it means ”local”
or a ”subsystem property” when the reduced density op-
erator is devoid of physical meaning to begin with, and
we do not know what the state of the subsystem is. The
two subsystems S and E are remote from each other.
This means that they cannot dynamically influence each
other. To put it in more detail, no ancilla (or measur-
ing instrument) interacting with subsystem E can have
any dynamical influence on the opposite subsystem S.
Now, isn’t it natural to stipulate with Zurek, that
subsystem or local properties of S are those properties
that cannot be changed by ”doing something” to the
opposite subsystem (action of an ancilla included), or
otherwise the property would be global? (It might be
useful to point out that the essential role of locality in
Zurek’s derivation is made clear also in his ”facts” (cf
the sixth quotation in subsection IV.C), especially in
fact 2.)
As to the parenthetical final remark of Schlosshauer
and Fine in assumption (4) (of the third quotation),
the present version did not make use of ”interchanged”
roles of S and E . Entanglement ”treats” the two
subsystems in a symmetrical way. So the interchange is
quite all right, but it was felt, in expounding the present
version, that it was unnecessary.
Schlosshauer and Fine say (DISCUSSION, (G)):
”According to Zurek, ...the observer is aware
of the ”menu” of possible outcomes...”
In the present version, one is after a local probabil-
ity rule and, to start with, one has no other idea what
”local” means, except what envariance gives. Gradually,
one endows the reduced density operator of the subsys-
tem with the known standard physical meaning. It seems
that this gradual building up knowledge of what ”local”
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means for probabilities is in Zurek’s wording handled by
the imaginary observer to whom, besides |Ψ〉SE , only
the subsystem S is accessible. But what is the ”sub-
system”? The state space HS and the state vectors in
it are all that is at the imaginary observer’s disposal and
at ours to start to build the ”subsystem” notion. This
is Zurek’s ”menu” (in the understanding of the present
author).
Perhaps, one should stress that, if one envisages
probability as a potentiality, as it is done in the
present approach, then it seems natural to take in
the ”menu” all state vectors | φ 〉S ; not just those
that are eigen-vectors of the reduced density operator
ρS , which, at the beginning, has almost no physical
meaning. (”Almost” is inserted in view of the Second
Theorem on twin unitaries.) Contrariwise, if one
envisages probabilities in the process of measurement
(or observation), as Zurek does (and his commentators
follow him), then taking the Schmidt decomposition is
the suitable procedure. In the present version, this is
avoided (except in the mathematical interlude, in de-
riving the properties of twin unitaries in subsection II.A).
In the last passage of the DISCUSSION of
Schlosshauer and Fine the basis of the opposite
subsystem that appears in the Schmidt decomposition is
subjected to though-provoking critical comments. This
is one of the reasons why the present version kept clear
of the Schmidt decomposition.
As to the eigenvalue-eigenstate link given in assump-
tion (1) (third quotation), Schlosshauer and Fine say
(DISCUSSION, (C)):
”Clearly, from the point of view of observa-
tions and measurements, we would like to as-
sign probabilities to the occurrence of the spe-
cific values of the observable O that has
been measured, i. e.,to the ”outcomes”. The
eigenvalue-eigenstate link of quantum me-
chanics postulates that a system has a value
for an observable if and only if the state of
the system is an eigenstate characteristic of
that value (or a proper mixture of those eigen-
states).”
In the preceding section it was assumed that events are
represented by projectors. This is the quantum logical ap-
proach (because projectors can be interpreted as events,
properties or logical statements), in which the projec-
tors are more elementary than observables. (Mathemat-
ically, one constructs Hermitian operators out of projec-
tors using the spectral theorem.) Physically, the yes-
no experiments carry the essence of quantum mechanics.
The quantum logical approach is resumed in subsection
V.B(a). (Zurek, in his Phys. Rev. paper, seems to be
trying to take a more general approach: he is dealing
with potential future records.)
On the other hand, observables and their eigenval-
ues (”outcomes”) are the standard or textbook start-
ing point for probabilities. Utilizing the eigenvalue-
eigenstate link, leading to the quantum logical stand-
point, is a choice of approach, which has to be justified
in the end. Namely, when the probability rule is finally
available, the eigenvalue-eigenstate link is a theorem: A
state (density operator) ρ has the sharp value o of an
observable O if and only if (i) the former is an eigen-
value of the latter and (ii) ρ, when written as any mix-
ture (possibly a trivial one)e states, it consists only of
eigen- states of O corresponding to this eigenvalue (cf
the Introduction in [22]).
Finally, it should be pointed out what has been taken
over from the article [2] of Schlosshauer and Fine. The
second quotation led to caution concerning ”putting in”
as little probability as possible. It was the reason for
avoiding the use of the Schmidt decomposition and hence
also assumption 3 (in the third quotation). The last quo-
tation gave rise to thoughts about the non-contextuality
involved (cf subsection V.B).
B. Barnum
In what follows a few comments in connection with
Barnum’s reaction [3] to Zurek’s derivation of probability
will be given.
Barnum says (p.2, left column):
”In our opinion, the version of Zurek’s argu-
ment we give below does not depend crucially
on whether measurement is interpreted in
this way (relative state interpretation, F. H.),
or as involving ”collapse”, or in some other
way (for example as involving ”collapse” of
our knowledge, say in a process similar to
Bayesian updating [23]).”
Hopefully, also the version of Zurek’s argument ex-
pounded in the preceding section is independent of the
existence or non-existence of objective ”collapse” in na-
ture. (As to purely subjective ”Bayesian updating”, it
is hard to see what one can update if nothing happened
in nature. Let us be reminded of John Bell’s famous
dictum: ”Information? Whose information, information
about what?” But, some of us may just be incorrigible
realists, ”whatever realism means” - as the late Rudolph
Peierls used to say.)
Assuming the existence of objective collapse, there are
two remote effects due to entanglement: distant measure-
ment [11], or more generally, remote ensemble decompo-
sition [9], and remote preparation [24], [25], [9] (the selec-
tive aspect of the former). It all started with Schro¨dinger
[24], who pointed out that doing a suitable selective mea-
surement on subsystem 2, one can ”steer” (his word for
remote preparation) the remote system 1 into any state
|φ〉1 that is an element of the range of ρ1, but with a
certain positive probability. (Schro¨dinger assumed that
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the range was finite dimensional. This was extended to
| φ〉1 ∈ R(ρ
1/2
1 ) in [25] for infinite dimensional ranges,
and the maximal probability, i. e., the best way to do
remote preparation, was evaluated recently [9].)
Neither Schro¨dinger [26], [24], nor anyone in the Bel-
grade group who worked on his program of ”disentangle-
ment” [11], [12], [9] has ever, to the best of the present
author’s knowledge, tried to utilize remote preparation
for an argument of probability because this would be
”putting probability in to get probability out” (cf the
second quotation in the preceding subsection), i. e., an
evidently circular argument.
It is a beauty of Zurek’s argument that envariance,
or remote unitary operation if one takes twin unitaries
(the other face of envariance), has no probability at the
start. It is deterministic: You perform a U2 local
transformation on the opposite subsystem, and ipso
facto one gets deterministically the transformation U1
on the subsystem that is investigated. So, Zurek seems
to be quite right that this concept can be used to shed
light on the quantum probability notion (as far as it is
assumed to be local).
One gets the impression that Barnum feels that his
insistence on no signalling and symmetric roles that S
and E should play is an important improvement on
Zurek’s argument. In particular, Barnum says (p. 2,
right column):
”Perhaps, however, there is a stronger ar-
gument for no S-to-E signalling in rela-
tive state interpretation. On such an inter-
pretation, once macroscopic aspects of E
have been correlated with S (the system
has been ”measured” by an observer who is
part of E ), the ability to affect probabili-
ties of components of the state in subspaces
corresponding to those distinct macroscopic
aspects of E , by manipulating S, jeopar-
dizes the interpretation of these numbers as
”probabilities” at all. ... (within a generally
subjectivist approach to probability in its as-
pect as something to be used in science and
everyday life..., an approach to which I am
rather partial),...”
Barnum is, of course, consistent. The purpose of
quoting this passage is mostly to underline the difference
in the approaches to Zurek’s argument by Barnum and
the present version. Namely, in the latter an attempt is
made to keep the remote influence in one direction only,
as Zurek originally did. Not because Barnum appears
to be wrong; it is because the one-direction approach is
considered simpler. There is another difference: Barnum
says to be partial to subjectivism, and the present
author has confessed above to be a realist. (This is not
in the sense to negate or underestimate subjectivism.
But the latter is understood by the present author as
subjective cognizance of objective reality.)
Barnum says (p. 3, both columns):
”...if the joint state SE is viewed as the
outcome of a measurement ”in the Schmidt
basis” on S, by an environment E that
includes the observer, whose ”definite mea-
surement results” line up with the Schmidt
basis for E , ascribing probabilities to these
suffices for ascribing probabilities to ”definite
measurement results” ...”
Also Schlosshauer and Fine pointed to this feature
of Zurek’s argument of ”putting in probability” in E ,
and ”getting out” probability in S (cf the second
quotation and assumption 3 in the third quotation in
the preceding subsection). Apparently, Zurek ”puts in”
no more than (probabilistic) certainty. This certainly is
not circularity. Nevertheless, the present version takes
another route.
There is another aspect of the present version that it
shares with Zurek’s original one. It is assuming non-
contextuality. But let us first see what Barnum says on
the subsject (p. 3, right column):
”Note that we have not yet established that,
for a given state, the probabilities of com-
ponents in subspaces are independent of the
subspace decomposition in which they occur,
an assumption similar to that made in Glea-
son’s theorem, and which might allow us to
use Gleason’s theorem as part of an argument
for quantum probabilities. Of course, a po-
tential virtue of the argument from envari-
ance is precisely that it does not make any
such assumption to begin with.”
One is here on quantum-logical grounds. Quantum-
logical non-contextuality means, in the understanding of
the present author, that if F is a composite event (the
projector project onto a more-than-2 dimensional sub-
space), then no matter in which of the infinitely many
possible ways F is written as a sum of mutually exclu-
sive (orthogonal) elementary events (ray projectors), and
defined in this way, the probability of F is one and the
same. This is so on account of σ-additivity. (See also
the discussion in subsection V.B(a)).
It is hard to see how one can avoid the quantum-logical
non-contextuality in Zurek’s argument. Namely, when
one wants to evaluate the probabilities of the equally
probable states | φ〉1 that correspond to one and the
same eigenvalue of ρ1 (stage one in the preceding sec-
tion), one cannot avoid using additivity. Besides, also
in the evaluation of the probability of the eigen-event
Q1 (the range projector) when ρ1 has only one pos-
itive eigenvalue requires the use of additivity (and the
zero-probability assumption, cf the third and the fourth
14
stipulations in the preceding section). Then, as it was
argued in the preceding passage, quantum-logical non-
contextuality has been utilized. (More on this in subsec-
tions V.B and V.E. See also subsection V.F.)
Gleason gives the complete answer (cf subsection
V.F). Then what is the point of Zurek’s argument? I’ll
attempt an answer to this worrisome question in the
concluding comments in the next section (see subsection
V.F).
After the quoted passage, Barnum writes about, what
he calls, the Perfect Correlation Principle. From the
point of view of the Belgrade group, he talks about
twin observables (cf subsection B on twin Hermitians
in section II.): The measurement of any subsystem
observable that is compatible (commuting) with the
corresponding reduced density operator is ipso facto
also a measurement (so-called distant measurement) of
a twin observable on the opposite subsystem.
Barnum further says, speaking of Stan and Emma
instead of subsystems, and applying his S → E no-
remote-influence (”no signalling”) approach (p. 3, right
column):
”Whether or not Stan measures anything
should be immaterial to Emma’s probability,
by no-signalling.”
Twin Hermitians are mathematically very closely con-
nected with twin unitaries (subsection B in section II.).
Distant measurement can make non-contextuality very
plausible for suitable, i. e., with the reduced density op-
erator compatible, subsystem observables. But distant
measurement is derived from the probability rule in quan-
tum mechanics. This way one cannot avoid circularity.
Subsystem observables not compatible with the cor-
responding density operator do not give rise to distant
measurement; they cause distant ensemble decomposi-
tion (see [9]). Here we are outside envariance, i. e., we
are using subsystem unitaries (in the sense of subsection
II.B) that do not have a twin.
On his page 5, left column, Barnum discusses at length
Zurek’s assumption of continuity of probability as a func-
tion of ρS . Among other things, he says:
”It is not clear to us why one would rule out
discontinuous probability assignments even
though they may seem ”pathological”.”
In the preceding section ”continuity” entered as the
fifth stipulation. It has led, in the end, to the quantum
probability rule. The argument presented leaves open
the possibility that also probability that is not contin-
uous in ρ might exist. But we know from Gleason’s
theorem that, though he does assume continuity in
the projectors (via σ-additivity as a strengthening
of additivity, cf subsection V.E), he does not assume
continuity in ρ. Thus, probability discontinuous in ρ
does not seem to exist.
The present author is especially indebted to Barnum
for his useful suggestion about how to extend Zurek’s ar-
gument to state vectors |φ〉1 that are not eigenvectors
of ρ1. He suggested (in private communication): ”Per-
haps one could get somewhere by making assumptions
about probabilities zero and one...” This fitted in well
with the theorem from previous work on the closest suit-
able state, i. e., state of zero and one probabilities (cf the
sixth stipulation in section III of this article and relation
(17)).
Finally, it should be stated what is the main insight
gained from the article [3] of Barnum. It confirmed
the suspicion, stemming from Zurek’s writings, that
the concrete idea of system and environment can be
generalized to any entangled subsystems. (Stan and
Emma achieve this.) The continuity assumption is not
as trivial as one might think. Barnum made me give a lot
of thought to the quantum-logical non-contextuality (cf
subsection V.B(a)), and the relation between Gleason’s
theorem and Zurek’s argument (cf subsection V.F).
C. Zurek’s most mature article on envariance
Zurek in his most mature, Physical Review, article
[16] takes into account the comments of Schlosshauer
and Fine and Barnum. The exposition of the preceding
section will now be put in relation to Zurek’s original
argument presented there. (Quotations will be taken
from pages in the archive copy, version 2.)
In the abstract Zurek says:
”Probabilities derived in this manner (he
means from envariance, F. H.) are an objec-
tive reflection of the underlying state of the
system - they represent experimentally veri-
fiable symmetries, and not just a subjective
”state of knowledge” of the observer.”
In the present version, one confines oneself to this atti-
tude of the founder of envariance, though he finishes the
abstract as follows.
”Envariant origin of Born’s rule for proba-
bilities sheds a new light on the relation be-
tween ignorance (and hence information) and
the nature of quantum states.”
On p. 1, left column he completes this thought as
follows:
”The nature of ”missing information” and the
origin of probabilities in quantum physics are
two related themes, closely tied to its inter-
pretation.”
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One cannot but fully agree with this. The subjective
side of Zurek’s argument has, nevertheless, been disre-
garded in the present version because considerably more
than the basic quantum formalism has been made use of
in it (unlike in the preceding versions), and, hence, it is
quite intricate as it is.
On p. 1, left column, Zurek says:
”We shall, however, refrain from using
”trace” and ”reduced density matrix”. Their
physical significance is based on Born’s
rule....,to avoid circularity,...”
In contrast to Zurek’s original version, in the present
one not only that ”trace” and ”reduced density matrix”
are not avoided, they are the mathematical starting
point. Admittedly, they are at the start physically
devoid of meaning. But the second theorem on twin
unitaries (the other face of envariance) in subsection A
of section II. discloses the relevance of these concepts
for envariance. Since one of the basic ideas of Zurek
is that the probabilities in the system S are local,
and we do not have the reduced density matrix ρS
determining the subsystem state and thus defining
locality, it appears natural to use envariance (twin
unitaries) for the definition of what is local. Then, the
mathematical notion of the reduced density matrix turns
out to be relevant, and gradually, taking the steps of
Zurek’s argument, the reduced density matrix becomes
endowed with the standard physical meaning.
At the beginning of his argument, on p. 2, right
column, Zurek lines up the basic assumptions of ”bare”
quantum mechanics (or quantum mechanics without
collapse): that the universe consists of systems, each
of which has a state space; that the state space of
composite systems are tensor products; and that the
unitary dynamical law is valid. (See also Zurek’s three
spelled out ”Facts” - the sixth quotation below.) All
these were tacitly assumed in section III.
At the beginning of the left column, p. 3, Zurek says:
”We shall call the part of the global state that
can be acted upon to affect such a restoration
of the preexisting global state the environ-
ment E . Hence, the environment-assisted
invariance, or - for brevity - envariance. We
shall soon see that there may be more than
one such subsystem. In that case we shall use
E to designate their union.”
It appears that Zurek envisages, actually, more-or-less
the whole universe , or at least, a large part of it
containing all systems that have ever interacted with
the subsystem S at issue. In contrast to this, the
version of the argument in section III laid emphasis
on the existence of entanglement with any opposite
subsystem (but cf subsection V.D). Any larger system
(1 + 2) in any entangled state | Ψ 〉12 that has one
and the same local or first-subsystem probability would
do. Since subsystem 2 is arbitrary, it can also be the
environment as Zurek envisages it.
On p. 4, left column, Zurek lists three ”facts”, which
he considers basic to his approach.
”Fact 1: Unitary transformations must act
on the system to alter its state. (That is,
when the evolution operator does not operate
on the Hilbert space HS of the system, i.
e., when it has a form . . . ⊗ 1S ⊗ . . . the
state of S remains the same.)
Fact 2: The state of the system S is
all that is needed (and all that is available)
to predict measurement outcomes, including
their probabilities.
Fact 3: The state of a larger composite sys-
tem that includes S as a subsystem is all
that is needed (and all that is available) to
determine the state of the system S.”
Zurek adds ”... the above facts are interpretation-
neutral and the states (e. g., ’the state of S ’) they
refer to need not be pure.”
I find Zurek’s ”facts” fully acceptable, and I have tac-
itly built them into the present approach (like the above
basic assumptions of the no-collapse part of quantum
mechanics). Actually, his broad ”state” concept helped
me to decide to stick to the reduced density operator
ρ1, the physical relevance of which is suggested by the
two theorems on twin unitaries in subsection II.A. As it
could be seen in section III, Zurek’s argument enables
one to endow the mathematical concept of the reduced
density operator gradually with the standard physical
meaning yielding the quantum probability rule.
On p. 4, left column, Zurek says:
”Indeed, Schmidt expansion is occasionally
defined by absorbing phases in the states
which means that all the non-zero coefficients
end up real and positive ... . This is a dan-
gerous oversimplification. Phases matter... .”
Zurek is, of course, quite clear about the role of
canonical Schmidt decomposition (see section II.A
above). What he means, I believe, is that one must be
careful about phases in any expansion of the global state;
one can disregard them only after a careful analysis
as the one he presents. Since the present version goes
beyond the Schmidt decomposition, it turned out that
the separate question of phases actually does not come
up.
On the other hand, one can fully accept his words (p.
4, bottom of right column):
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”Lemma 3 we have just established is the cor-
nerstone of our approach.”
His Lemma 3 is about envariant swaps of orthogonal
first-subsystem eigenstates of ρ1, and, later in his
Theorem 2., it implies their equal probability. In
methodological contrast to Zurek’s Lemma 3, in section
III above the second theorem on twin unitaries (section
II.A) was used to establish equal probability of any two
state vectors in one and the same eigensubspace of ρ1.
But, this is, of course, equivalent to Zurek’s Theorem 2.
On p. 5, left column, Zurek gives a very nice discussion
of the complementarity between knowledge of the whole
and knowledge of the part - complementarity of global
and local due to entanglement . There was no need to
enter this in the present version.
On p. 7, right column, Zurek says:
”Let us also assume that states that do not
appear in the above superposition (i. e., ap-
pear with Schmidt coefficient zero) have zero
probability. (We shall motivate this rather
natural assumption later in the paper.)”
This is the fourth stipulation in section III. This is
”rather natural” when we already know the quantum rule
of probability. In Zurek’s setting of no such knowledge,
it appears to come out of the blue. But a stipulation can
do this.
Zurek resumes this question on p. 19, left column, con-
sidering a rather intricate composite state ”representing
both the fine-grained and the coarse-grained records”.
He essentially describes observation or measurement in
my understanding. He says:
”The form of ... (the composite state, F. H.)
justifies assigning zero probability to ... (state
vectors of the system, F. H.) that do not ap-
pear, - i. e., appear with zero amplitude - in
the initial state of the system. Quite simply,
there is no state of the observer with a record
of such zero-amplitude Schmidt states of the
system ... (in the composite state, F. H.).”
This is convincing in the context of Zurek’s objective
probabilities - as he calls them. If probability is treated
as a potentiality, no matter if it will be ever measured or
not, as it is in the present approach, then one had better
not use this argument. (It is used only as a plausibility
justification in the present version.)
On p. 7, right column, Zurek says:
”Moreover, probability of any subset of n
mutually exclusive events is additive. ... We
shall motivate also this (very natural) as-
sumption of the additivity of probabilities
further in discussion of quantum measure-
ments in Section V (thus going beyond the
starting point of e. g. Gleason ...)”
Zurek has stated (on p. 5, left column) that he will use,
besides envariance, also ”a variety of small subsets of nat-
ural assumptions”. At this place of his text, it appears
that additivity of probability is one of them. Actually,
it is a very strong assumption on the quantum-logical
ground(cf the discussion of this in subsections V.B(a)
and V.E). One can accept that the measurement context
makes it more plausible, but it still is an extra assump-
tion.
Zurek resumes this question on pp. 18 and 19. He is
at pains to derive ”additivity of probability from envari-
ance”. He says:
”To demonstrate Lemma 5 (a key step in
his endeavor, F. H.) we need one more prop-
erty - the fact that when a certain event U
(p(U) = 1) can be decomposed into two mu-
tually exclusive events, U = k ∨ k⊥, their
probability must add up to unity:
p(U) = p(k ∨ k⊥) = p(k) + p(k⊥) = 1.
This assumption introduces (in a very lim-
ited setting) additivity. It is equivalent to
the statement that ”something will certainly
happen”.”
We have discussed above the Schlosshauer and Fine
comment ”you put in probability, to get out probability”.
Zurek’s just quoted passage looks somewhat similar:
you put in additivity, to get out additivity (though you
put it in ”in a very limited setting”, but at the crucial
place). This question is resumed in detail in subsection
V.E.
Zurek starts his subsection D. of section II. stating
that he will ”complete derivation of Born’s rule” by
considering the case of unequal absolute values of the
coefficients in the Schmidt decomposition. Clearly,
unlike section III of this paper, Zurek had no intention
to go further than encompassing the eigenvectors of ρ1.
In his terminology, that is ”Born’s rule”.
Zurek finishes section II., after he has discussed ratio-
nal moduli of Schmidt coefficient (which has been com-
pletely taken over in section III above) saying:
”This is Born’s rule. The extension to the
case where |ak|
2 (the moduli, F. H.) are
incommensurate is straightforward by conti-
nuity as rational numbers are dense among
reals.”
This seems to be another of Zurek’s ”natural assump-
tions”. In the present version, it was raised to the level
of a stipulation following the convincing discussion of
17
Barnum (cf the last quotation and the last passage in
the preceding subsection).
Zurek’s section V is devoted to a rederivation of Born’s
rule from envariance. In his section II. the environment
E could and needed not contain an observer. He didn’t
actually make use of him. In section V the observer is
explicitly made use of (consistent with, e. g., the relative-
state theory of Everett [27]). One gets the feeling that
this exposition, in which it is explicit that Zurek is after
probability in the process of measurement (or observa-
tion), is more convincing and successful.
In the present version, measurement is ”off limits” (as
Zurek would say). Twin unitaries (the other face of en-
variance) are a direct consequence of entanglement (cf
subsection II.A of this article). In the present version,
Zurek’s argument was treated as strong enough to carry
out the complete program: quantum probability rule
from entanglement, treating the former as a potential-
ity. This standpoint is, apparently, in keeping with the
following passage of Zurek’s paper.
On p. 23, left column, Zurek says:
”...even when one can deduce probabilities a
priori using envariance, they better be consis-
tent with the relative frequencies estimated
by the observer a posteriori in sufficiently
large samples. ... We shall conclude that
when probabilities can be deduced directly
from the pure state (he means | Ψ〉SE , F.
H.), the two approaches are in agreement ,
but that the a priori probabilities obtained
from envariance-based arguments are more
fundamental.”
Precisely so! Because probabilities are an a priori
notion, and ”more fundamental” than the relative
frequencies, in terms of which they are measured, the
probabilities should be treated as a potentiality.
Finally, it is needless to state what has been learn’t
from Zurek. The entire theory is his. The rest of us
are only conjuring up different variations on it to gain a
deeper grasp of the matter.
D. Mohrhoff
I’ll begin with the abstract of Mohrhoff’s paper [4] on
Zurek’s ”Born’s rule from envariance” argument, which
lacks Zurek’s Physical Review paper (discussed in the
preceding subsection), and both Barnum’s article and the
one of Caves in its references. Mohrhoff says:
”Zurek claims to have derived Born’s rule
noncircularly... from deterministically evolv-
ing quantum states. ... this claim is exag-
gerated if not wholly unjustified. ...it is not
sufficient to assume that quantum states are
somehow associated with probabilities and
then prove that these probabilities are given
by Born’s rule.”
Mohrhoff calls in question the, as he puts it, ”so-called
derivation” of Born’s rule. Strictly logically, ”derivation”
of a claim means that the claim is a necessity. Now,
probabilities are a necessity in a deterministically evolv-
ing universe from a physical point of view as made clear
in section V of Zurek’s Phys. Rev. paper. But logically,
Mohrhoff is right that one assumes the existence of
probabilities, and then one finds out what they look like.
The present version is certainly not better than that.
Mohrhoff even strengthens his critical attitude on p.
4 (the archive version is taken) after having shortly re-
viewed Zurek’s argument:
”What is thereby proved is that if quan-
tum states are associated with probabilities
then Born’s rule holds. But how do quan-
tum states come to be associated with prob-
abilities? As long as this question remains
unanswered, one has not elucidated the origin
of probabilities in quantum physics, as Zurek
claims to have done.”
In spite of Zurek’s wording in expounding his argu-
ment, he does not appear to be claiming to have answered
Mohrhoff’s ”question”; the present version certainly has
not. One becomes pessimistic at this point, and one is
inclined to partially agree with Mohrhoff’s first sentence
in his Introduction:
”In any metaphysical framework that treats
quantum states as deterministically evolving
ontological states, such as Everett’s many-
worlds interpretation, Born’s rule has to be
postulated.”
Zurek’s derivation of Born’s rule suggests that this
claim should be weakened be replacing ”Born’s rule” in
it by ”probability”.
In the following quotation (bottom of p. 6), Mohrhoff
hits at the very foundation of Zurek’s argument.
”The rather mystical-sounding statement
that knowledge about the whole implies igno-
rance of the parts (he means complementar-
ity of global and local, F. H.) is thus largely a
statement about correlated probability distri-
butions over measurement outcomes. Given
its implicit reference to probabilities, it does
not elucidate the ”origin of probabilities” but
rather shows that probabilities are present
from the start, however cleverly they may be
concealed by mystical language.”
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As far as correlated probability distributions are con-
cerned, Mohrhoff has a point. Indeed, the remote effects,
which can be, in principle, either immediately confirmed
by coincidence measurement or subsequently by a suit-
able measurement on the opposite (remote) subsystem,
are observationally nothing else than correlated probabil-
ities.
Does this ruin Zurek’s argument? I think not at all.
Complementarity of global and local is a well known
fact. Besides, entanglement should be understood as
another peculiar potentiality, which can lead to the
potentiality of probability. After all, the latter is what
Zurek is after (at least as it is understood in the present
version). Hopefully, these potentialities are not just
”mystical language” ”concealing” the true state of affairs
(cf subsection V.C).
Mohrhoff’s rejection of Zurek’s argument is rather
deep-rooted. On p. 7 he says:
”To my mind, the conclusion to be drawn
from the past failures (including Zurek’s) to
derive probabilities noncircularly from de-
terministically evolving ontological quantum
states, is that quantum states are probabil-
ity measures and should not be construed as
evolving ontological states. Theorists ought
to think of them the way experimentalists
use them, namely, as algorithms for comput-
ing the probabilities of possible measurement
outcomes on the basis of actual measurement
outcomes.”
It seems that Mohrhoff has accepted Bohr’s stand-
point that ontology in quantum physics is metaphysics,
i. e., beyond physics, perhaps philosophy. Mohrhoff has
even strengthened Bohr’s rejection of a nowadays rather
widely accepted ontology speaking of ”pseudophysics”
(or false physics). He seems to be, what one sometimes
calls, an ”instrumentalist” believing only in the reality of
the laboratory instruments; the rest is ”mystical
language” [28]. This calls to mind Mermin’s, perhaps
somewhat unjust, nickname for such a standpoint: ”the
shut up and calculate interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics” (cf the article by Schlosshauer and Fine).
Though Mohrhoff stands at the farthest from the
ontological standpoint of Zurek and the rest of his com-
mentators (including the present author), his criticism
and objections should be taken seriously. After all,
ontology is also a potentiality; if one does not believe in
it, you can’t prove it.
Finally, let it be stated what has been learnt from
Mohrhoff’s article. His scepticism about the non-
circularity of Zurek’s argument (cf the first quotation,
and especially the second one) helped to decide to try
to treat probability as a potentiality (without any mea-
surement or observation). Next, following Mohrhoff’s
explicit warning (see his third quotation), the present
version postulates the existence of probability (as part
of the first postulate). Mohrhoff’s uncompromising
attitude is a challenge that has led to an attempt to put
Zurek’s argument in a transparently non-circular way.
To what extent the present version has succeeded in this
will be discussed again in the next section (cf subsection
V.C).
E. Caves
Caves’ reaction [5] to Zurek’s argument appeared with
all the references that have been commented upon so far.
At the very beginning of his treatise, Caves reacts
to the Phys. Rev. Letters version, and comments on
Zurek’s subjective standpoint saying:
”It is hard to tell from WHZ’s (Zurek’s, F.
H.) discussion whether he sees his derivation
as justifying the Born rule as the way for an
observer to assign subjective probabilities or
as the rule for objective probabilities that ad-
here within a relative state.”
Later on, Caves quotes the same as in my first quo-
tation in the subsection on Zurek’s Phys. Rev. paper,
and decides that ”WHZ is thinking in terms of objective
probabilities”. In the present version the subjective side
of the problem is completely omitted, but it should be
emphasized that this is not because it is not considered
important.
Though sometimes it is hard to see one’s way through
Zurek’s ”underbrush of verbiage” (as Caves says for
Barnum) in his copious expositions (the exposition in
the present article is probably no better), it is clear that
Zurek’s approach to fundamental problems is rather
all-encompassing. In particular, he, no doubt, recognizes
that no thorough ontology can disregard epistemology.
But in the latter, the observer’s cognition is a reflection
of reality. When an observer cannot distinguish two
envariantly swapable states, e. g., this means, that they
are objectively indiscernible, i. e., equal, etc. (I am sure,
Caves sees the work of Zurek in a similar manner, but he
seems to object to the way how Zurek unfolds his ideas.)
On p. 2, Caves starts with a simple (non-composite)
system A, and a non-trivial observable for it. He
then points out that Zurek considers the unitary
evolution corresponding to interaction with an ideally
measuring apparatus B. (Ideal measurement is not
only a non-demolition one, i. e., result preserving, but
also eigen-state preserving, and, of course, probability
preserving.) This fits well into the sixth stipulation of
the present version, in which the closest suitable state
is the Lu¨ders state corresponding precisely to ideal
measurement.
Caves further says on p. 2:
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”Notice that what I am saying is that in
WHZ’s approach, it is the Schmidt relative
state that defines the notion of outcomes for
system A; without the entanglement with
system B , one cannot even talk about out-
comes for the basis {| ak〉} (the eigenbasis
of the measured observable, F. H.).”
Zurek ”derives” probabilities from entanglement, and
the latter he displays in terms of a Schmidt decomposi-
tion. No re-definition of events takes place here. (One
can read in Zurek’s Phys. Rev. article a detailed dis-
cussion on how events, pointer states, etc. emerge from
correlations.)
Caves further says (on the same page):
”... it has already been assumed that the
probabilities that he is seeking ... have no de-
pendence on the environmental states | bk〉
(partners of |ak〉 in the Schmidt decompo-
sition, F. H.). This is a kind of foundational
noncontextuality assumption that underlies
the whole approach. I will call it environ-
mental noncontextuality for lack of a better
name.”
This is an attempt to view Zurek’s derivation from
another angle. In section III of this article a rather
different, though essentially equivalent view was pre-
sented. Perhaps, one should be reminded of it. The
probabilities in subsystem A (to use Caves’ notation
for the first subsystem), though defined by the bipartite
entangled state |ψ〉AB , are actually locally determined.
Then the rest of the argument goes on in utilizing
twin unitaries (the other face of envariance) to find
this local determination. Naturally, by the very fact of
local determination of subsystem probability (the first
stipulation), the details of the opposite subsystem (the
environment) don’t really matter. Therefore, no empha-
sis was put on Cave’s ”environmental non-contextuality”.
On p. 3 Caves says:
”WHZ wants to view envariance as the key
to his derivation, but it is just a way to
write the consequences of environmental non-
contextuality, when they provide any useful
constraints, in terms of system unitaries, in-
stead of environment unitaries. It turns out
not to be necessary to translate environmen-
tal non-contextuality to system unitaries for
any of the steps in the derivation.”
The last statement seems to be the most important
one in Caves’ article; it appears to be the program of his
version of Zurek’s argument. And he carries it out in
the rest of his paper.
In Caves’ version, as in all the other versions, Schmidt
decomposition is adhered to as the only widely known
way how to handle entanglement. As a consequence, it
turns out indispensable to put some probability in the
environment, to get out probability in the system. It is
assumption (3) in the article of Schlosshauer and Fine;
Barnum calls it the Perfect Correlation Principle (same
as ”twin observables” in the work of the Belgrade group);
Zurek uses it and emphasizes that probability-one state-
ments are put in; Caves accepts Barnum’s term. It con-
sists simply in equal probabilities of the partners in a
Schmidt decomposition. Both Barnum and Caves make
use of the environment in a way that is more than nec-
essary from the point of view of the present approach.
Namely, on p. 4 Caves says:
”The point is that WHZ’s derivation depends
on an unstated assumption that one can
interchange the roles of systems A and B
in the case of Schmidt states with amplitudes
of equal magnitude.”
In contrast to the rest of the authors of versions com-
mented upon so far, Caves couldn’t readily accept the
suitable extension of the environment to reduce unequal
Schmidt coefficients to equal ones. On p. 6 he says:
”We were originally told that the very notion
of outcomes for system A required us to
think about a joint pure state with the ap-
propriate Schmidt decomposition. Now we
are told that the notion of outcomes requires
us to think about a much more complicated
three-system joint state, where the two ad-
ditional systems must have a dimension big
enough to accommodate the rational approx-
imation to the desired probabilities. Does
this mean the notion of outcomes depends on
the value of the amplitudes? This is a very
unattractive alternative, so what we really
must think is that for all amplitudes, the no-
tion of outcomes requires us to think in terms
of a big three-system joint state, where B
and C have arbitrarily large dimensions.
We are now supposed to believe that the no-
tion of outcomes for system A requires us
to think in terms of two other systems corre-
lated in a particular way, which has no appar-
ent relation to the number of outcomes of sys-
tem A. Even a relative-state believer would
find this hard to swallow, and it makes the
Perfect Correlations Principle assumption far
less natural, because this construction wrecks
the nice-looking symmetry between A and
the systems to which it is coupled and even
between AB and C. It is a heck of a lot
less attractive than the original picture we
were presented and really should have been
stated at the outset.”
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This rebellious passage of Caves was of great help in
realizing that one should not confine oneself to unitaries
of the opposite system that have a twin for the system
under consideration treating locality. Also broader
opposite-subsystem unitaries cannot change what is
local in the system (see the second stipulation in section
III of this article), and hence are part of the definition
of the subsystem state and local properties. Then
interaction with a suitable ancilla, which takes place in
terms of such a unitary, comes natural, and subsystem
A of the enlarged system A + BC that Caves is
objecting to still has the same locality or subsystem
state, and the same subsystem probabilities.
Caves closes his consideration on p. 6 saying:
”In the end one is left wondering what makes
the envariance argument any more com-
pelling than just asserting that a swap sym-
metry means that a state with equal ampli-
tudes has equal probabilities and then moving
on to the argument that extends to rational
amplitudes.”
One should bear in mind that the swap symmetry is
equivalent to symmetry under the group of twin uni-
taries, which is, in turn, equivalent to the essence of the
envariance argument.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the need for
broader opposite-subsystem unitaries than just those
U2 that have a twin U1 (see the second stipulation
in the present version) is not the only thing that has
been learnt from Caves’ article [5]. His comments raised
the question how to extend Zurek’s argument to isolated
systems. (A solution using continuity is presented in the
present approach.)
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are some points that require additional clarifi-
cation and comment.
A. Summing up the stipulations of the present
version
The FIRST STIPULATION is: (a) Though the given
pure state |Ψ〉12 determines all properties in the com-
posite system, therefore also all those of subsystem 1,
the latter must be determined actually by the subsystem
alone. This is, by (vague) definition, what is meant by
local properties.
(b) There exist local or subsystem probabilities of all
elementary events |φ〉1〈φ |1, |φ〉1 ∈ H1.
The SECOND STIPULATION is that subsystem or
local properties must not be changeable by remote action,
i. e., by applying a second-subsystem unitary U2 to
| Ψ 〉12 or any unitary U23 applied to the opposite
subsystem with an ancilla (subsystem 3 ).
The most important part of the precise mathematical
formulation of the second stipulation is in terms of twin
unitaries (cf (8a)). No local unitary U1 that has a twin
U2 must be able to change any local property.
The σ-additivity rule of probability is the THIRD
STIPULATION. It requires that the probability of ev-
ery finite or infinite sum of exclusive events be equal to
the same sum of the probabilities of the event terms.
The FOURTH STIPULATION: Every state vector
|φ〉1 that belongs to the null space of ρ1 (or, equiva-
lently, when |φ〉1〈φ|1 acting on |Ψ〉12, gives zero) has
probability zero. (The twin unitaries do not influence each
other in the respective null spaces, cf (9a,b). Hence, this
assumption is independent of the second stipulation.)
The FIFTH STIPULATION: the sought for probabil-
ity rule is continuous in ρ1, i. e., if ρ1 = limn→∞ ρ
n
1 ,
then p(E1, ρ1, X) = limn→∞ p(E1, ρ
n
1 , X), for every
event (projector) E1, and X stands for the possi-
ble yet unknown additional entity needed for a complete
local probability rule. Further we assume that X, if it
exists, does not change in the convergence process.
The SIXTH STIPULATION: Instead of ρ1, of which
the given state | φ〉1 is not an eigen-state, we take a
different density operator ρ′1 of which | φ 〉1 is an
eigenvector, i. e., for which ρ′1 |φ〉1 = r
′ |φ〉1 is valid,
and which is closest to ρ1 as such. We stipulate that
the sought for probability is r′.
Comparing the stipulations to Zurek’s facts (sixth
quotation in subsection IV.C), we see that facts 3 and 2
strictly correspond to the first stipulation (a). (Fact 1
is connected with answering the question in subsection
V.G.)
Let us compare the 6 stipulations with the 4 assump-
tions of Schlosshauer and Fine (cf the third quotation
from their article). Assumption (1) is not among the
former, because I understand Zurek’s starting point is
quantum logical, and so is mine. Zurek does not seem to
consider observables, and neither am I.
Assumption (3) is avoided because of the possible sus-
picion that it is ”putting probability in” (cf the second
quotation from Schlosshauer and Fine) though Zurek re-
marks that it is no more than putting probability-one
statements in.
Three assumptions that, apparently, cannot be
avoided, have been raised to the status of stipulations:
that of σ-additivity, that of null probability of the
null-space vectors | φ 〉1, and, finally that of conti-
nuity. (The sixth stipulation in the present version is,
of course, not covered by Schlosshauer and Fine be-
cause they did not consider extending Zurek’s argument.)
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B. Non-contextuality in the quantum logical
approach
(a) The event non-contextuality. From the quantum
logical point of view, the elementary events occur in only
one way. There is no question of context. But on ac-
count of the implication relation in the structure of all
events (the projector E implies the projector F, i.
e., E ≤ F if and only if EF = E ) every composite
event can occur as a consequence of the occurrence of
different elementary events that imply it. Nevertheless,
the probability does not depend on this.
As a matter of fact, the probabilities of the composite
events are in Section III of this article, following Zurek,
defined in terms of mutually exclusive elementary events
(orthogonal ray-projectors, each defined by a state vec-
tor) using σ-additivity.
(b) Non-contextuality with respect to observables. A
given elementary (or composite) event can, in general,
be the eigen-event (eigen-projector) of different ob-
servables. (This, essentially, amounts to the so-called
eigenvalue-eigen-state link.) Correspondingly, the event
can occur in measurement of different observables. The
probability of the event does not depend on this.
C. Circularity?
In the second quotation from the article of
Schlosshauer and Fine, the curse of a ”fundamental state-
ment” that one cannot ”get probability out” of a theory
unless one ”puts some probability in” should be valid also
for the present version. It appears to be valid no more for
the present version of Zurek’s argument than for Glea-
son’s theorem. Namely, what both ”put in” is the as-
sumption that probability exists and that σ-additivity
is valid for it.
Let us return to Mohrhoff’s attempt of a fatal blow
at Zurek’s argument in the last but one quotation from
his article stating that entanglement itself is correlation
of probabilities. Hence, using entanglement as a starting
point means ”putting probability in”. No wonder that
one ”gets probability out”.
One can hardly shatter Mohrhoff’s criticism. It all
depends on how much belief one is prepared to put in
theory. Taking an extremely positivistic attitude, one
can say that, e. g., ”interference” is all that exists in
the phenomenon when one sees it; ”coherence” in the
quantum mechanical formalism giving rise to interference
is, according to such a point of view, just a part of the
formalism without immediate physical meaning.
If one decides, however, to allow some reality to
theoretical concepts, then, in the case at issue, ”en-
tanglement” is a theoretical concept (the correlation
operator in the present approach), a potentiality, which
is believed to be real in nature. We can observe its
consequence as correlation of probabilities, but it is more
than that.
D. The role of entanglement
In the present version, entanglement enters through,
what was said to be, the sole entanglement entity - the
correlation operator Ua (see the correlated subsystem
picture in section II.A.). In terms of this entity the first
theorem on twin unitaries (near the end of section II.A.)
gives a complete answer to the question which unitaries
have a twin, and which opposite-subsystem unitary is the
(unique) twin.
In section III, in unfolding the present version, the
correlation operator (and hence entanglement) was not
made use of at all. All that was utilized was the gen-
eral form of a first-subsystem unitary that has a twin:
U1 =
∑
j U
j
1Q
j
1 + U1Q
⊥
1 , where 11 =
∑
j Q
j
1 + Q
⊥
1
is the eigen-resolution of the unity with respect to (dis-
tinct eigenvalues) of the reduced density operator ρ1
(
≡
tr2(|Ψ〉12〈Ψ|12)
)
, and ∀j : U j1 is an arbitrary unitary
in the eigen-subspace R(Qj1) corresponding to the pos-
itive eigenvalue rj of ρ1 (cf (9a)). (In the necessity
part of the proof, Ua was not used; it was used only in
the sufficiency part.)
These unitaries (Zurek’s envariance unitaries) are uti-
lized to establish what are local or first-subsystem prop-
erties, in particular, local probabilities. It immediately
follows that any two distinct eigen-vectors correspond-
ing to the same eigenvalue of ρ1 determine equal-
probability events (cf Stage one in section III). Thus,
envariance is made use of in the first and most important
step of Zurek’s argument in a completely assumption-of-
probability-free way.
Nevertheless, twin unitaries (envariance) is due to en-
tanglement, and Zureks argument is based on the latter.
Entanglement is, as well known, the basic staff of which
quantum communication and quantum computation are
made of. No wonder that entanglement is increasingly
considered to be a fundamental physical entity. As an il-
lustration for this, one may mention that preservation of
entanglement has been proposed as an equivalent second
law of thermodynamics for composite systems (cf Ref.
[29] and the references therein).
E. σ-additivity
To get an idea how ”heavy” the σ-additivity assump-
tion for probability intuitively is, we put it in the form of
a ”staircase” of gradually strengthened partial assump-
tions.
The starting point is the fact is that if any event F
occurs, the opposite event F⊥
(
≡ (1 − F )
)
does
not occur (in suitable measurement, of course).
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1) It is plausible to assume that F + F⊥ = 1 has
p(F ) + p(F⊥) = 1 as its consequence in any quantum
state.
2) If E + F = G (all being events, i. e., projectors,
and EF = 0 ), then, in view of the fact that, e. g.,
F is the opposite event of E in G, i. e., F =
E⊥G, and in view of assumption (1), it is plausible to
assume that E+F = G implies p(E)+p(F ) = p(G)
in any quantum state. Obviously, assumption (2) is a
strengthening of assumption (1).
Lemma. Assumption (2) implies additivity for ev-
ery finite orthogonal sum of events:
∑
iEi = G ⇒∑
i p(Ei) = p(G) in any quantum state.
Proof. If the lemma is valid for n terms, then
p
( (n+1)∑
i=1
Ei
)
= p
(
(
n∑
i=1
Ei) + E(n+1)
)
=
p
( n∑
i=1
Ei
)
+ p(E(n+1)) =
(n+1)∑
i=1
p(Ei),
i. e., it is valid also for (n+ 1) terms. By assumption,
it is valid for two terms. By total induction, it is then
valid for every finite sum. ✷
3) If G = limn→∞ Fn and the sequence {Fn : n =
1, 2, . . . ,∞} is non-descending ( ∀n : F(n+1) ≥ Fn ⇔
F(n+1)Fn = Fn ), then the assumption of continuity in
the probability p(G) = limn→∞ p(Fn) is plausible (oth-
erwise one could have jumps in probability and no event
responsible for it). Assuming the validity of assumption
(2), it implies
p(
∞∑
i=1
Ei) = p( lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
Ei) =
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
p(Ei) =
∞∑
i=1
p(Ei),
i. e., σ-additivity ensues.
If one wants to estimate how ”steep” each of these
”stairs” is, one is on intuitive ground burdened with feel-
ing and arbitrariness. Assumption (1) seems to be the
largest ”step” (with respect to the stated fact that is its
premise). Once (1) is given, assumption (2) (equivalent
to additivity of probability) seems very natural, hence
less ”steep”. The final assumption (3) seems even more
natural, and hence least ”steep”.
At one place Zurek admits that (1) is an assumption (cf
the last-but-two quotation in the subsection on Zurek’s
article). One wonders if he can avoid to assume (2).
Leaning on ”the standard approach of Laplace” [30] (sec-
ond passage, right column, p. 18, [16]), in which ”by
definition” ”the probability of a composite event is a ra-
tio of the number of favorable equiprobable events to the
total”, property (2) of probability follows. Zurek seems
to adopt this reasoning to a large extent within eigen-
subspaces R(Qj1) of ρ1 (cf (7c) in this article). Thus,
partially he can avoid to assume (2). But can he do this
generally?
The form 〈 φ |1 ρ1 | φ 〉1 of the probability rule
achieved, following Zurek, in the present version (shortly,
the present form), is equivalent to the (much more gen-
erally looking) trace rule precisely on account of σ-
additivity. Taking an infinitely composite event E =∑∞
i=1 | i 〉〈 i |, σ-additivity allows to transform the
present form into the trace rule:
p(E) =
∞∑
i=1
〈i | ρ | i〉 =
∞∑
i=1
tr(ρ | i〉〈i |) = tr(ρE).
Thus, without σ-additivity the present form is not the
standard probability rule.
Besides, the argument just presented can appear in
the very context of Zurek’s argument. Let | Ψ〉12 be
infinitely entangled, or, equivalently, let ρ1 have an
infinitely dimensional range. Further, let the above set
{| i〉1 : i = 1, 2, . . . ,∞} (with index) be a set of eigen-
vectors of ρ1 (corresponding to different eigenvalues),
but let they not span the whole range R¯(ρ1). With-
out the validity of σ-additivity the present rule does
not give an answer what is the probability p(E1, ρ1),
where E1 ≡
∑∞
i=1 | i〉1〈 i |1 . Thus, if one want the
general form of the probability rule, and in the present
version nothing less is wanted, then one must assume (2)
and the continuity in (3).
F. Zurek’s argument and Gleason’s theorem
In an effort to tighten up Zurek’s argument, his ”small
natural” and some tacit assumptions have been avoided
as much as possible. The most disquieting consequence
was raising σ-additivity to the status of a stipulation.
This was no different than in Gleason’s well known the-
orem [31], which goes as follows.
One assumes that one has a map associating a num-
ber p from the doubly-closed interval [0, 1] with ev-
ery subspace, or, equivalently, with every projector F
(projecting onto a subspace) observing σ-additivity, i.
e.
p(
∑
i
Fi) =
∑
i
p(Fi) (24a)
for every orthogonal decomposition (finite or infinite) of
every projector. Then, for every such map, there exists
a unique density operator ρ such that
p(F ) = tr(Fρ) (24b)
for every projector (the trace rule). Thus, the set of all
density operators and that of all quantum probabilities
stand in a natural one-to-one relation.
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Logically, this makes the other five stipulations (be-
sides σ-additivity) in the present version of Zurek’s ar-
gument unnecessary. Barnum is on to this (see the above
fourth quotation from his article), but his understand-
ing seems to be that Zurek’s assumption of additivity
is weaker than that of Gleason. At least in the present
version this is not so.
Let us be reminded that in Stage one of section III ad-
ditivity had to be used in concluding that if ρ1 |φ〉1 =
rj |φ〉1, and the corresponding eigen-projector is Q
j
1,
projecting onto a dj -dimensional subspace (which is
necessarily finite), then the probability of | φ 〉1 is
p(Qj1)/dj .
Further, σ-additivity had to be used in Stage two to
conclude that p(Qj1) = rjdj , where also the fourth pos-
tulate about zero probabilities from the (possibly infinite
dimensional) null space of ρ1 had to be utilized. (”Had
to be” means, of course, that ”the present author saw no
other way”.)
Zurek’s argument is very valuable though we have the
theorem of Gleason. Perhaps a famous dictum of Wigner
can help to make this clear. When faced with the chal-
lenge of computer simulations to replace analytical solu-
tions of intricate equations of important physical mean-
ing, Wigner has allegedly said ”I am glad that your com-
puter understands the solutions; but I also would like to
understand them.”
Schlosshauer and Fine say (in the Introduction to their
paper):
”...Gleason’s theorem is usually considered as
giving rather little physical insight into the
emergence of quantum probabilities and the
Born rule.”
As to the logical necessity of ”the emergence of quan-
tum probabilities”, it seems hopeless (unless if the prob-
abilities would prove subjective, i. e., due to ignorance,
like in classical physics, after all). Neither Gleason, nor
Zurek, nor anybody else - as it seems to me - can de-
rive objective quantum probability, in the sense to show
that it necessarily follows from deterministic quantum
mechanics. But, once one realizes from physical consid-
erations that probability must exist, then one makes the
logical assumption that it exists, and then one wonders
what its form is.
Gleason gives the complete answer at once in the form
of the trace rule. One can then derive from it the other
five postulates of the present version and more. To
use Wigner’s words, the mathematics in the proof of
Gleason’s theorem ”understands” the uniqueness and the
other wonders of the quantum probability rule, but we
do not.
Now, the extra 5 stipulations in the present version
(besides σ-additivity), though logically unnecessary
in view of Gleason’s theorem, nevertheless, thanks to
Zurek’s ingenuity, help to unfold before our eyes the
simplicity and full generality of the quantum rule in the
form 〈φ | ρ |φ〉 (equivalent to the trace rule).
G. Why unitary operators?
Both envariance and its other face, unitary twins, are
expressed in terms of unitary operators. One can raise
the question in the title of the subsection.
The answer lies in the notion of distant influence. One
assumes that the nearby subsystem 1 is dynamically
decoupled from another subsystem 2, but not statis-
tically. Quantum correlations are assumed to exist be-
tween the two subsystems. On account of these correla-
tions one can manipulate subsystem 2 in order to make
changes in subsystem 1 (without interaction with it).
By definition, local are those properties of the nearby
subsystem that cannot be changed by the described dis-
tant influence. Probabilities of events on subsystem 1
were stipulated to be local.
One is thinking in terms of so-called bare quantum
mechanics, i. e., quantum mechanics without collapse.
Then all conceivable manipulations of the distant subsys-
tem are unitary evolutions (suitable interactions of suit-
ably chosen subsystems - all without any interaction with
subsystem 1 ). As Zurek puts it in his Fact 1 (sixth
quotation in subsection IV.C): ”Unitary transformations
must act on the system to alter its state.” (This goes
for the distant subsystem which should exert the distant
influence.)
Unitary evolution preserves the total probability of
events. The suspicion has been voiced that the restric-
tion to unitary operators might just be a case of ”putting
in probability in order to get out probability” [32]. Even
if this is so, it appears to be even milder than Zurek’s
”putting in” probability-one assumptions (cf last passage
in subsection B.1 in [16]).
One may try to argue that the unitarity of the evo-
lution operator (of the dynamical law) does not contain
any probability assumption. Namely, one may start with
the Schro¨dinger equation, of which the unitary evolu-
tion operator is the integrated form (from instantaneous
tendency of change in a finite interval). At first glance,
the Schro¨dinger equation has nothing to do with prob-
abilities. But this is not quite so. The dynamical law,
instantaneous or for a finite interval, gives the change of
the quantum state, which is, in turn, equivalent to the
totality of probability predictions.
Perhaps one should not expect to derive probabilities
exclusively from other notions (cf the second quotation
from Ref. 2 in subsection IV.A).
APPENDIX A
We prove now that the correlation operator Ua is
independent of the choice of the eigen-sub-basis of ρ1
(cf (5a)) that spans R¯(ρ1) in which the strong Schmidt
decomposition of |Ψ〉12 (cf (3c)) is written.
Let {| j, kj 〉1 : ∀kj , ∀j} and {| j, lj 〉1 : ∀lj , ∀j} be
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two arbitrary eigen-sub-bases of ρ1 spanning R¯(ρ1).
The vectors are written with two indices, j denoting
the eigen-subspace R(Qj1) to which the vector belongs,
and the other index kj ( lj ) enumerates the vectors
within the subspace.
A proof goes as follows. Let
∀j : |j, kj〉1 =
∑
lj
U
(j)
kj ,lj
|j, lj〉1,
where
(
U
(j)
kj ,lj
)
are unitary sub-matrices. Then, keep-
ing Ua one and the same, we can start out with the
strong Schmidt decomposition in the kj -eigen-sub-basis,
and after a few simple steps (utilizing the antilinearity of
Ua and the unitarity of the transition sub-matrices), we
end up with the strong Schmidt decomposition (of the
same |Ψ〉12 ) in the lj-eigen-sub-basis:
|Ψ〉12 =
∑
j
∑
kj
r
1/2
j |j, kj〉1
(
Ua |j, kj〉1
)
2
=
∑
j
∑
kj
{
r
1/2
j
(∑
lj
U
(j)
kj ,lj
|j, lj〉1
)
⊗
[
Ua
(∑
l′
j
U
(j)
kj ,l′j
|j, l′j〉1
)]
2
}
=
∑
j
∑
lj
∑
l′
j
{
r
1/2
j
(∑
kj
U
(j)
kj ,lj
U
(j)∗
kj ,l′j
)
|j, lj〉1⊗
(
Ua |j, l
′
j〉1
)
2
}
=
∑
j
∑
lj
∑
l′
j
{
r
1/2
j δlj,l′j |j, lj〉1⊗
(
Ua |j, l
′
j〉1
)
2
}
=
∑
j
∑
lj
r
1/2
j |j, lj〉1
(
Ua |j, lj〉1
)
2
.
✷
APPENDIX B
We elaborate now the group of pairs of unitary twins.
Let (U ′1, U
′
2) and (U1, U2) be two pairs of twin uni-
taries for a given bipartite state vector |Ψ〉12, i. e., let
U ′1 |Ψ〉12 = U
′
2 |Ψ〉12, and U1 |Ψ〉12 = U2 |Ψ〉12, be
valid. Then, applying U2 to both sides of the former
relation, exchanging the rhs and the lhs, and utilizing the
latter relation, one has:
U2U
′
2 |Ψ〉12 = U2U
′
1 |Ψ〉12 = U
′
1U2 |Ψ〉12 = U
′
1U1 |Ψ〉12.
Hence, (U ′1U1, U2U
′
2) are twin unitaries, and one can
define a composition law as (U ′1, U
′
2) × (U1, U2) ≡
(U ′1U1, U2U
′
2). Naturally, the trivial twin unitaries
(11, 12) are the unit element. Then the inverse of
(U1, U2) has to be (U
−1
1 , U
−1
2 ) , and it is the inverse
from left and from right of the former, and it is the unique
inverse as in a group it should be. But it is not obvious
that (U−11 , U
−1
2 ) are twin unitaries.
It is well known (and easy to see) that the set of all
(bipartite) unitaries U12 that leave the given state
| Ψ 〉12 unchanged is a subgroup of all unitaries, the
so-called invariance group of the vector. If (U1, U2)
are twin unitaries, then U1U
−1
2 leaves | Ψ 〉12
unchanged or envariant (cf (8a) and (8b)). Its inverse
is (U1U
−1
2 )
−1 = U−11 (U
−1
2 )
−1. Then (U−11 , U
−1
2 ) are
twin observables. ✷
APPENDIX C
Those linear operators A in a complex separa-
ble Hilbert space are Hilbert-Schmidt ones for which
tr(A†A) < ∞ ( A† being the adjoint of A ). The
scalar product in the Hilbert space of all linear Hilbert-
Schmidt operators is
(
A,B
)
≡ tr(A†B) (cf the Defini-
tion after Theorem VI.21 and problem VI.48(a) in [17]).
The statement that ρn converges to ρ in the topol-
ogy determined by the distance in the Hilbert space of
all linear Hilbert-Schmidt (HS) operators means:
lim
n→∞
||ρ− ρn||
2
HS = lim
n→∞
tr(ρ− ρn)
2 =
lim
n→∞
∑
k
〈φk | (ρ− ρn)
2 |φk〉 = 0,
where {|φk〉 : ∀k} is an arbitrary basis.
On the other hand, the claim that ρn converges to
ρ in the strong operator topology means [17] that
∀ |ψ〉 : lim
n→∞
||ρ |ψ〉 − ρn |ψ〉||
2 =
lim
n→∞
〈ψ | (ρ− ρn)
2 |ψ〉 = 0.
Thus, the latter topology requires convergence to zero
only for each vector separately (without any uniformity
of convergence for some subset), whereas the former
topology requires the same uniformly for any basis,
moreover for their sum (which may be infinite). The
former topology requires much more, and hence it is
stronger.
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